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I. INTRODUCTION

In an earlier article entitled Justice and Jesuit Legal Education: A Critique,1 I
took issue with a claim made frequently by those whose job it is to promote Jesuit
legal education. The gist of this claim is that the type of education offered to students
at Jesuit law schools is distinctive and, at least by implication, qualitatively better than
the education made available to students at other law schools. 2 I argued that this
*
Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A. 1985, University
of Notre Dame; J.D. 1988, Harvard University. I wish to thank Lee J. Strang and the other faculty at
Ave Maria School of Law where I presented an earlier version of this paper at a faculty workshop. I
also wish to thank Adriaan Peperzak and Michael Schuck of the Center for Catholic Intellectual
Heritage at Loyola University Chicago for the helpfiul comments I received in presenting a version of
this paper to colleagues from disciplines other than law. I am especially grateful to David Ingram for
his thorough comments on the piece. I also wish to thank Mark Osler at Baylor Law School who
was the principal organizer behind the Sixth Conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools held
at Baylor in March 2006. The invitation I received to speak at this conference served as the genesis
for this article. I am also grateful to Amy Uelmen and Gregory Kalscheur, S.J., with whom I
appeared on a panel at the conference. Lastly, I wish to thank Thomas M. Donnelly, Richard A.
Gamett, Michael P. Moreland, Anthony 0. Pottinger, Vincent D. Rougeau, Mark A. Sargent, Michael
A. Scaperlanda and Spencer Weber Waller for commenting on earlier drafts of the piece, and Mary
Eileen Weicher for her research assistance.
I.
John M. Breen, Justice andJesuit Legal Education: A Critique,36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
383 (2005).
2.
These arguments are nicely summarized in Steven M. Barkan, Jesuit Law Schools:
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purported distinctiveness has more to do with the imagination of those who draft
brochures for prospective students and prepare the content of Jesuit law school
websites,3 than it does with the reality of legal education that takes place at such
schools.
Indeed, in the original piece I argued that Jesuit legal education, as it is currently
practiced in this country, must be judged a failure based on the very standards of
success set forth by the Society of Jesus.4 That is, Jesuit law schools seek to
distinguish themselves from other schools by defining their special mission as "the
promotion of justice. ' 5 References to this goal and the related goal of forming "men
and women for others" litter the mission statements and other self-descriptions of
these institutions.6 The schools derive this language from the foundational
documents of the Society of Jesus, especially General Congregations 32 and 34.7

Challenging the Mainstream, CONVERSATIONS ON JESUrr HIGHER EDUC., Spring 1993, at 7. For my
response to Barkan's particular contentions, see Breen, supranote 1, at 411 n. 120.
3.
See Breen, supra note 1, at 391-403 (arguing that the provision of clinical programs does
not distinguish Jesuit law schools from other kinds of law schools and that the vaunted Jesuit concern
for "the promotion of justice" is not a evident in any special way in the curricula of law schools
sponsored by the Society of Jesus).
4.
Let me make clear that in writing the original piece, I did not single out Jesuit institutions
for special treatment. Instead, they invited the scrutiny and criticism they received on themselves.
After all, they had the audacity (a cherished Jesuit trait) to claim that their schools stand apart from
the bulk of the legal academy in their singular devotion to the promotion ofjustice, a devotion which
they claim pervades the life of these institutions precisely because they are Jesuit. Having said that,
much of what I had to say in the original article (and in these remarks) is applicable to other, nonJesuit Catholic law schools. Indeed, regardless of the sponsoring religious community, many of the
failures of Catholic legal education are shared failures.
5.
See, e.g., Saint Louis University School of Law, Law School History,
http://law.slu.edu/Alumni/history.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2007) ("Since its inception, the School of
Law has adhered to the Jesuit spirit of 'Men and Women for Others' and that creed is incorporated in
all facets of our community."); Marquette University Law School, Jesuit Mission,
http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&pagelD=154 (last visited Oct. 13, 2007) (quoting
statement of Father General Peter Hans Kolvenbach, S.J.,
echoing Father Arrupe that the purpose of
Jesuit education is to form "men and women 'for others').
6.
The source of this phrase is the now famous address that the late Father General of the
Society of Jesus, Pedro Arrupe, delivered at the Tenth International Congress of Jesuit Alumni in
Europe. See Pedro Arrupe, S.J., Superior Gen. of the Society of Jesus, Address at Valencia: Spain,
Men for Others (July 31, 1973), available at http://www.creighton.edu/CollaborativeMinistry/menfor-others.htm. As the Creighton University website makes clear, the phrase "men for others" has
been "adapted ... to include 'men and women' to make its powerful message applicable for a
contemporary Jesuit alumni audience." Id.
7.
See THE DECREES OF THE 32ND GENERAL CONGREGATION OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS,
Decree 4, 2 (1975), reprintedin DOCUMENTS OF THE 3 1ST AND 32ND GENERAL CONGREGATIONS OF
THE SOCIETY OF JESUS 411 (1977) [hereinafter 32ND GENERAL CONGREGATION] (stating that "[tlhe
mission of the Society of Jesus today is the service of faith, of which the promotion of justice is an
absolute requirement"); THE DECREES OF GENERAL CONGREGATION THIRTY-FoUR, THE FIrEENTH OF
THE RESTORED SOCIETY AND THE ACCOMPANYING PAPAL AND JESUIT DOCuMENS, Decree 3,
3
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The difficulty with this identification is that these schools almost invariably point
to the clinical opportunities that they make available to students as proof of their
commitment to justice and the fulfillment of their mission. 8 Although clinical legal
education is surely a necessary component of Jesuit identity, it is not a sufficient one.
According to the American Bar Association, at most, only one out of every three
students goes through a clinical experience while in law school. 9 Thus, clinical
education cannot be the means whereby justice is promoted throughout the student
body. In addition, clinical education cannot be the distinguishing feature of Jesuit
legal education since every law school in the country offers some sort of clinical
program that provides legal services to the poor and disadvantaged. If clinical
education is the heart and soul of Jesuit identity, then Harvard, Texas and UCLA are
10
excellent "Jesuit" law schools, to say nothing of Pepperdine and Cardozo.
Furthermore, to the extent that education about justice does take place in the clinical
setting, it is almost entirely affective rather than intellectualin nature. In this context,
justice is taken to be something that is immediately perceived in an intuitive fashion
rather than as something that often requires careful thought and deliberation in order
to be understood. Because none of the fourteen Jesuit sponsored law schools require
a course in jurisprudence,' 1 it is entirely possible for a student to graduate from one of
these institutions without ever having been asked to think seriously and rigorously
about the nature ofjustice and its meaning in law.
Instead, the one indispensable feature that a Catholic or Jesuit law school must
have in order to be deserving of the name is to bring the Catholic intellectual tradition
to bear on questions of law and justice. Indeed, the school's Jesuit and Catholic

(1995), reprintedin DOCUMENTS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH GENERAL CONGREGATION OF THE SOCIETY
OF JESUS 40 (1995) [hereinafter 34TH GENERAL CONGREGATION] (renewing the Jesuit commitment
"to the promotion ofjustice as an integral part of our mission").

8.

For examples of how clinical programs are invoked by Jesuit law schools as proof of

their Jesuit identity, see Breen, supra note 1, at 391-98; see also id. app. at 419-31 (appendix
gathering statements from the self-descriptions of the fourteen Jesuit sponsored law schools, many of
which refer to their clinical programs as proof of the fulfillment of their Jesuit mission).

9.

See A.B.A.-SECnON OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT OF THE

TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 252 (1992); see also

Breen, supra note 1, at 396 n.67 (citing other authorities likewise concluding that only about onethird of all law students participate in a clinical program).
10.
Descriptions of the respective clinical opportunities available to students at these law
schools can be found at the following websites: Harvard Law School-Clinical and Pro Bono
Programs, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/clinical/index.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2007); The

University of Texas at Austin School of Law-Clinical Education at UT Law,
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/clinics/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2007); Pepperdine University
School of Law, Clinical Education Program, http://law.pepperdine.edu/clinical/ (last visited Oct. 13,
2007);
Benjamin
N.
Cardozo
School
of
Law,
Clinical
Programs,
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/academic prog/clinicalprog.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
11.
See Breen, supra note 1, at 402 n.86 (surveying the curricular requirements of the
fourteen Jesuit sponsored law schools).
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identity must be located in the heart of the academic enterprise itself: in the
classroom, in the law school's curriculum, and in the research and other intellectual
work supported by the school. To banish this identity to the periphery, to the nonacademic activities of the law school, would ultimately render that identity
meaningless--Catholic window dressing on an otherwise secular institution.
Although a Jesuit law school should be open to every point of view--even those
inimical to the Catholic faith-if it does not seriously engage the Catholic intellectual
tradition and invite its students to do the same, then it should cease to engage in the
pretense of being either Catholic or Jesuit. Absent this kind of engagement, Jesuit
law schools will continue to offer "more of the same" rather than the distinctive brand
of legal education they claim to provide.
What I had hoped to accomplish in advancing this thesis in the original article
was to demonstrate that the claim of Jesuit distinctiveness in legal education simply
cannot stand-up to scrutiny. What I hope to do in the article that follows is to clarify
and further develop some of the ideas set forth in that piece, and to respond to some
of the criticisms that I have received since its publication.
H1.A REPLY TO THREE CRITICISMS:

CURRICULUM, LEGAL CLINICS, AND NOSTALGIA

In setting forth the critique described above, it was my intention to "stir the pot"
of Jesuit legal education, a pot that has sat undisturbed for so long that its contents
have begun to ossify. Part of this stirring consisted of sending a reprint of the original
article to every faculty member at every Catholic law school in the country, some
1,400 in all. This effort to encourage a frank discussion of Jesuit identity in legal
education, beyond the confident slogans of Jesuit distinctiveness, has bome some
fruit in that the piece has been discussed in a number of forums.' 2 Perhaps it is not
surprising that I have received a large number of comments in response to the piece,
some of which I hope to answer in the remarks that follow.
One such criticism concerns the scope of my proposal. I am told that the piece
suffers from the fact that, among other things, it does not address the curriculum as a
whole. 13 Although I believe that the article is clear on this point, let me leave nothing
12.

In September 2005, I presented an abbreviated version of the paper as part of a

conference entitled Joy in the Truth: The Catholic University in the New Millennium, sponsored by

Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture. See Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, Annual
Fall Conferences-Joy in the Truth, http://ethicscenter.nd.edu/events/falconfs/jitt.shtml (last visited
Oct. 13,2007).
The piece has also been cited by Richard John Neuhaus in a recent installment of The Public
Square in FIRST THINGS. See Richard John Neuhaus, The PublicSquare, FIRST THINGS, Aug.-Sept.
2006, at 66, 82. It has also been the subject of an extensive debate on the Catholic legal theory blog
Mirror of Justice. See, e.g., Posting of Susan Stabile to Mirror of Justice, Catholic Law Schools
Revisited,
http://www.mirrorofustice.com/
(July
8, 2005,
12:11),
available at
http://www.mirrorofustice.con/mirrorojustice/2005/07/catholic law sc.html.
13.
E-mail from John T. Halloran to John M. Breen (Jan. 23, 2005, 23:37:29) (on file with
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to doubt. In the original piece, I did not offer, nor did I purport to offer, a
comprehensive proposal for the teaching of justice in a Jesuit law school. My aim
was much more modest than this. My proposal was designed merely to save Jesuit

institutions from the embarrassment of being judged deficient by the very criteria that
the Society of Jesus sets forth as the defining features of its apostolate, including its
educational apostolate. 14 I leave the task of setting forth a complete agenda for
programmatic reform of Jesuit legal education to another day, and perhaps to others

more familiar with the ideals of Saint Ignatius and the unique charisms of his
company. 15
A second criticism that I have received is that the piece is insufficiently
supportive of clinical programs.' 6 I do not think that a fair reading of the text
supports this characterization of my position. Indeed, I expressly stated that
"[c]linical legal programs are enormously valuable both as a pedagogical tool and as
author).
14.
See 34TH GENERAL CONGREGATION, supra note 7, Decree 3, 3 (concluding that "we
want to renew our commitment to the promotion of justice as an integral part of our mission, as this
has been extensively developed in General Congregations 32 and 33"); id, Decree 17, 7 (asserting
that "the adjective 'Jesuit'... requires that the university act in harmony with the demands of the
service of faith and promotion ofjustice found in Decree 4 of [General Congregation] 32.").
15.
Although I am the product of sixteen years of formal Catholic schooling (parochial
school through college) my first introduction to Jesuit education was my appointment at Loyola.
Thus, my ideas for a more thorough-going reform are generally more Catholic than specifically
Jesuit.
I should add, however, that my reluctance to speak in an authentically Jesuit way reflects a
recent failure on the part of the Society of Jesus to share its unique charism with others. My
familiarity with the Ignatian tradition of education is almost entirely a product of self-education.
During my now ten-year experience as a faculty member, the Jesuits have made almost no effort to
share their identity with those who might be interested in it. I say this notwithstanding the Heartland
Conferences and other institutional mechanisms ostensibly employed to introduce faculty to Jesuit
identity.
As a newly hired assistant professor, I vividly recall my wife and I attending a dinner
welcoming me and other new faculty to Loyola University. After dinner, the head of the University's
Center for Faith and Mission showed a video entitled Shared Vision: Jesuit Spirit in Education,
prepared by the Institute of Jesuit Sources at Saint Louis University, introducing the Society of Jesus
and detailing the early fife and conversion of St. Ignatius Loyola. SHARED VISION: JEsurr SpIRT IN
EDUCATION (St. Louis University 1995). As my wife and I both noted, nowhere in the film or in the
ensuing conversation was Jesus Christ ever mentioned. I am mindful both of the fact that the
purpose of events of this sort is not Christian evangelization, and of the difficulties faced in trying to
transmit the Ignatian vision in the face of rapidly declining numbers of Jesuits at Jesuit institutions.
Still, it is difficult to comprehend how even a minimally adequate introduction to the Society of Jesus
could take place without referring to the One for whom the Society is named and for whose sake all
of its activities are undertaken.
16.
See, e.g., Andrew F. Moore, Contact and Concepts: Educating Students at Jesuit Law
Schools, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 459, 470 (2005-2006) (contending that my prior article "neglects to make
an explicit connection between the issue ofjustice in Jesuit legal education" and "the most powerful
learning experience in legal education," namely, "direct service to the poor and underserved").
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a means of supporting the Jesuit mission."' 7 Further, I noted in passing that "a
powerful case can be made that a Jesuit law school should insist on the completion of
some formal clinical experience as a requirement for graduation."', 8 Elsewhere I have
argued that the attorney-client relationship has a profoundly religious and spiritual
dimension to it insofar as the practice of law affords lawyers the opportunity to serve
the needs of other human beings with whom God is profoundly united in the Mystery
of the Incarnation.1 9 Plainly, this value-a value at the heart of Jesuit spirituality 2°is present in an especially poignant way in the representation of disadvantaged
persons in a clinical setting. Accordingly, Jesuit law schools should be especially
enthusiastic in their support of clinical education if they are to be true to their identity
as Jesuit and Catholic.2'
A third criticism that has been aired is that the normative view of Catholic legal
education set forth in my earlier piece is in some way nostalgic for a by-gone era in
which authentic Catholic identity flourished.22 I must confess that I find this criticism
somewhat bewildering in that I do not believe that the article contains any trace of
nostalgia. I do not pine for some past age when Catholic, and in particular, Jesuit law
schools fulfilled their distinctive mission effectively and with enthusiasm, nor do I
believe that the article expresses any such sentiment. Indeed, to my mind, no
"Golden Age" of American Catholic legal education has ever existed--either before
or after the Second Vatican Council-such that there is no historical model that
Catholic law schools today should seek to emulate. Rather, in attempting to describe
what a Catholic and Jesuit law school ought to look like, those engaged in the
conversation today are attempting to provide something new, or at any rate something
more thoughtful and self-conscious than the relatively simple and unreflective models
that were in place when many of these institutions were founded. In What . Wrong
with the World, GK. Chesterton famously remarked: "The Christian ideal has not
23
been tried and found wanting. It has been found difficult; and left untried.
Something very similar to this could be said of Catholic legal education. Acceptance
of a genuinely Catholic law school in the wider academy has been found difficult,
17.
Breen, supra note 1, at 398.
18.
Id. at 396.
19.
John M. Breen, The Catholic Lawyer: Justice andthe Incarnation, 39 CATH. LAW. 269,
270-75 (2000).
20.
See generally, DAVID LONSDALE, EYES TO SEE, EARS TO HEAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO
IGNATiAN SPrruALITy (2000).
21.
Mark A. Sargent, An Alternative to the Sectarian Vsion: The Role of the Dean in an

Inclusive Catholic Law School, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 171, 187 (2001) (arguing that a Catholic law
school must be committed to making the kind of service learning that takes place in law clinics
available to students "because it is Catholic").
22.
See, e.g., Posting ofAmy Uelmen to Minor of Justice, Questions for John Breen on his
Critique of Jesuit Legal Education, http://www.mirroroflustice.com/ (May 4, 2005, 9:20), available
at http://www.mirrorofjustice.com/mirorofjustice/2005/05/Questions-forj.html.
23.

GK. CHESTERTON, WHAT'S WRONG WrrH THE WORLD 37 (1910).
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and so the great project of Catholic legal education in all its fullness has been left
largely untried.
Having said that, and without, I hope, sounding too triumphal, I am nostalgic in
one respect. Although the original article did not express this point of view, I confess
to being nostalgic for one of the characteristics that defined most Catholic law
schools prior to the 1970s, namely, the fact that these schools were not ashamed of
being Catholic and of promoting that identity in public.24 Today it seems, most law
schools are at best apologetic about their Catholic affiliation--"apologetic" not in the
original sense of the word, of being able to give an account of what one believes and
why, but "apologetic" in the more contemporary sense of being embarrassed.2 5
Moreover, if they manifest some pride in this identity, it is only insofar as that identity
can be translated into terms that are readily understood and accepted in the secular
academy, hence the emphasis on clinics.
As a general historical matter, law schools sponsored by Catholic universities
identified with their Catholic mission in a more muted fashion than their
undergraduate counterparts.2 6 This identification became even more understated

24.

the

In the late 1950s through the 1960s, the Catholic Lawyer published a series of profiles of

various Catholic law schools. Typically, these pieces were authored by the dean or a faculty
member at the school. See infra, note 26. The profile for St. Louis University School of Law states:
"The school is indelibly Catholic. For this it feels need to offer neither explanation nor justification.
In law as in life the Catholic effort is toward finding truth in both its oneness and diversity. No
obstacle exists to sharing that goal with others." John E. Dunsford, St. Louis -Pioneer Catholic Law
School, 3 CAm. LAW. 237, 241 (1957). Nothing even approaching this kind of forthright
endorsement of Catholic identity can be found in the mission statements or websites of any of the
fourteen Jesuit sponsored law schools that exist today, including St. Louis' whose current mission
statement blandly states: "The School of Law is guided by the Jesuit tradition of academic
excellence, freedom of inquiry and respect for individual differences." St. Louis University School
of Law, Mission, http://law.slu.edu/admissions/apply/overview.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2007). It
would, indeed, be remarkable to find a law school-secular or religious-that does not subscribe to
precisely these values. The same simply could not be said of St. Louis' earlier self-description.
25.
Cf, Mark A. Sargent, We Hold These Truths - The Mission of a Catholic Law School,
COMMONWEAL, Apr. 25, 2003, at 14, 15 ("The first essential characteristic is that the school is
unapologetic about its Catholic identity. Catholic identity should not be downplayed because some
members (or potential members) of the community may find its expression uncomfortable."). Proof
that a sense of embarrassment persists can be seen in the sparse mention made of Jesuit and Catholic
affiliation on the websites of the fourteen Jesuit sponsored law schools. Indeed, three law school
websites make no mention of this affiliation at all. See Breen, supra note 1, app. at 419-31
(summarizing the content of Jesuit law school and university websites with respect to mission).
Further, as an anecdotal matter, several students have told me of their experiences visiting other
ostensibly Catholic law schools as prospective students during which time they were told by their
tour-guides that the purported Catholic affiliation was "nothing to worry about."
26.
For example, in the series of Catholic law school profiles noted above that appeared in
the Catholic Lawyer, several of the schools chose to make almost no mention of their Catholic
affiliation, choosing instead to emphasize the programs, courses of instruction, library, classroom
facilities, and other features that made them centers of legal education comparable to their non-

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1

Catholic counterparts. See, e.g., William Hughes Mulligan, The Fiflieth Anniversary of Fordham
University School of Law, 2 CATH.LAW. 207, 207, 212 (1956) (noting only the Jesuit origins of
Fordham and an address by John Courtney Murray, S.J.); Warren P. McKenney, Santa Clara
University College of Law, 5 CATH. LAW. 61, 61-62 (1959) (acknowledging the Jesuit origins of the
school and noting the presence of a St. Thomas More Society whose members sponsor a quarterly
Communion Breakfast); James N. Castleberry, Jr., St. Marys University School of Law, 6 CATH.
LAW. 49, 49-50 (1960) (noting only the school's sponsorship by the Society of Mary and the annual
presentation of a St. Thomas More Award); Edward E C. McGonagle, Duquesne University School
of Law, 6 CArT-I. LAW. 137, 137 (1960) (mentioning only the school's founding and sponsorship by
the Congregation of the Holy Ghost); William Kelly Joyce, Sr., The University of Detroit Law
School, 7 CATH. LAW. 41, 44 (1961) (stating that the school has "two objectives--professional and
apostolic" and that it "blends" two great traditions "the legal and the Jesuit"); Vincent F. Vitullio,
Loyola University School ofLaw-Chicago,7 CATH. LAW. 305, 305 (1961) (stating only that Loyola
in Chicago strives to be "a law school of the highest excellence conducted in the Jesuit tradition");
Owen G Fiore, Loyola University School of Law, 9 CATH. LAw. 219, 219, 221 (1963) (noting only
that Loyola in Los Angeles is sponsored by the Jesuit order and hosts a St. Thomas More Law
Society).
Those law schools that did mention their Catholic identity often did so by referring to
opportunities for prayer, reception of the sacraments, and religious retreats. See, e.g., Francis E.
Lucey, S.J., The Story of Geotgetown Law School, 3 CATr. LAw. 129, 135 (1957) (mentioning the
chapel in a law school dormitory as well as the school's annual retreats and monthly Mass and
Communion Breakfast including an address by a theologian or ethics professor); Dunsford, supra
note 24, at 239 (stating that a Jesuit priest "is available throughout the semester to advise the students
on personal problems, and closed retreats at Hazelwood, Jesuit retreat house near St. Louis, are
offered to the Catholic students"); Boston College Law School, 4 CATH. LAW. 153, 156 (1958)
(observing that Boston College has "[a] regular spiritual program conducted by the student St.
Thomas More Society [which] includes an annual retreat, periodic talks and the daily rosary under
the guidance of Father John A. Tobin, S.J."); Miriam T. Rooney, Seton Hall University School of
Law, 5 CAmH. LAW. 305, 308 (1959) (noting that to "inculcate a consciousness of God as the Author
of all law and the cause of our freedom, each class is begun with the recitation of the Lord's Prayer"
and that at Seton Hall "each academic year is begun with a Mass invoking the assistance of the Holy
Spirit"); Robert Q. Kelly, De Paul University College of Law, 6 CATH. LAW. 287, 289 (1960)
(referring to a St. Thomas More window in the law school chapel, and the annual Red Mass
"accompanied by a sermon on the natural law"); Joyce, supra,at 44 (noting that Detroit "revived one
of the medieval traditions of the law, namely, the celebration of the so-called Red Mass"); Guy E
Smith, Gonzaga University School of Law, 7 CATH.LAw. 121, 124 (1961) (noting that in 1959
"Gonzaga celebrated its first Red Mass" in conjunction with the meeting of the Washington State Bar
Association).
Those schools that discussed their Catholic identity as an aspect of the academic work of the
school invariably mentioned the natural law tradition, often in religious and theological rather than
philosophical terms. See, e.g., Harold Gill Reuschlein, Fllanova-Newest of the Catholic Law
Schools, 3 CAT. LAW. 15, 17 (1957) (stating that Villanova was founded out of "the need for a place
dedicated to the synthesis of Christian wisdom and painstaking legal scholarship" but not describing
how this is present in the curriculum); Lucey, supra at 129-30 (noting that Georgetown offers "a
course on Ethics and its relation to positive law" and a course on Comparative Jurisprudence);
Dunsford, supra note 24, at 241 (asserting that the "underlying approach to the study of law" at St.
Louis "accepts a philosophy which recognizes the divine origin and destiny of man and his
responsibility to guide his actions by revealed truth and natural law" while also recognizing that most
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positive laws "are not unchangeable, but depend upon the contingencies of time and place");
Reynolds C. Seitz, Marquette Law School-Fifty Years of Service in the Middle West, 3 CATH. LAW.
331, 331-32 (1957) (observing that Marquette draws from St. Ignatius and the Jesuits "the ideals and
spirit which cause it to acknowledge that there is an ideal and objective order of justice based upon
the natural law by which human beings are endowed with certain inalienable God-given rights and
obligations" such that every student is required to take two courses in Jurisprudence, a general
overview of natural law principles and a specific application to the positive law taught by faculty
"who acknowledge the existence of the natural law [and] frequently evaluate problems in the light of
such law"); John E. North, Creighton Law School-A PrivateInstitution in the Public Service, 4
CATH. LAW. 77, 82 (1958) (remarking that Creighton "places strong emphasis upon the moral value
of the legal principles, rules, and policies found in the various courses" such that students form "the
habit of testing past and prospective patterns of legal activity by the law of God"); Vernon X. Miller,
The Law School of the Catholic UniversityofAmerica, 4 CATH. LAw. 333, 336-37 (1958) (stating that
CUA's law school is "working to relate Catholic social and moral philosophy to the problems of
politics as they are reflected in court decisions, legislation and the tradition of the common law"
while acknowledging differences of opinion among faculty, stating that they "have in common an
appreciation of the profound implications and soundness of Catholic philosophy"); Antonio E.
Papale, The Law School of Loyola University New Orleans, 5 CAm. LAW. 219, 220 (1959) (noting
that Loyola in New Orleans is "entrusted with the significant responsibility of presenting the positive
law of the State as a means by which the scholastic concept of natural law ought to be implemented"
and describing natural law as "the objective pattern of moral behavior consonant with human nature
and the will of a divine Lawgiver" and asserting that natural law "is the integrating element in the
entire law school curriculum" and indeed its "controlling philosophy"); Rooney, supra, at 306
(recognizing that a required course in Jurisprudence at Seton Hall "affords the principal means of
ascertaining the philosophical premises implicit in many judicial opinions, and of forcing the student
...
to give some thought to how he could improve the law while asking himself why the rule is so");
Richard A. Vachon, S.J., The University of San Francisco School of Law, 6 CATH.LAw. 221, 223
(1960) (highlighting San Francisco's course in Jurisprudence and stating that the school "adheres to
the Christian principle that the truth shall make men free" and to "the equally valid principle" that the
truth is not always "knowable now"); Alfred F. Geimer, University of San Diego School of Law, 8
CATH.LAw. 121, 122 (1962) (quoting the dean as stating that the school's purpose is to give students
"a sound legal education in an environment conducive to the development of high ethical standards
compatible with Catholic philosophy" and "awakening in the student an appreciation of natural
law"); Sidney B. Hill, Catholic University ofPuertoRico School ofLaw, 8 CATH.LAW. 305, 306, 342
(1962) (stating that the purpose of the school is "[t]o probe the relationship of the civil and common
law with that of the ethical and natural law" and "to perpetuate the Christian Doctrine and Philosophy
of the law."); John J. Murphy, St. Johns University School of Law: A Profile, 18 CATH. LAW. 270,
271 (1972) (celebrating the publication of CATHOLIC LAWYER and quoting the current law school
bulletin as saying the school "strives to integrate a sound legal education with a love of God, a
respect for His laws and a zeal for equitable administration of justice" by creating "an environment
for all students Catholic and non-Catholic alike which is favorable to the development of high ethical
standards and of a sound and mature philosophy of law compatible with Catholic philosophy").
Perhaps not surprisingly, the most thorough exposition of Catholic identity in terms of curricular
and other academic features can be found in the article describing the Notre Dame Law School. See
Edward F. Barrett, The Notre Dame Experiment, 2 CATH. LAW. 294, 297-307 (1956) (giving special
emphasis to the school's Natural Law Institute and subsequent NaturalLaw Forum). Indeed, in what
might be taken as an implicit criticism and challenge to other Catholic law schools-both at the time
and today-the article contends that: "A 'Catholic' law school is Catholic when its Catholic name
and symbols truly mean that the philosophy of Catholicism is the soul of the entire curriculum and
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beginning in the 1970s when law school enrollments exploded with the entry of large
numbers of women and minorities into the applicant pool.27 Catholic law schools
sought to respond to this new demographic reality by appealing to a wider group of
potential applicants beyond their historic constituencies. 28 Regrettably, this move
often included the tendency to minimize Catholic identity as a distinctive, let alone
positive, feature of the institution.29
I confess to being nostalgic for Catholic schools that were not ashamed of their
Catholic identity as such. This is not a sentimental longing for the past, but a desire
to recover the courage to be Catholic. Christian triumphalism is, of course, anathema
to many who claim membership in the tired and now-aging generation of selfdescribed "Vatican II Catholics." 30 While this point of view is often overstated, it
not merely of one isolated course. Otherwise, it is but a convenience maintained by a Catholic
university for the benefit of Catholic students who might just as well go elsewhere to study law." Id
at 294.
27. See, e.g., Thomas 0. White, A Retrospective Examination of Law School Admissions,
The Law School Admission Council, and Law School Admission Services, in LAW SCIOOL
ADMissioNs, 1984-2001: SELECTING LAwYERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13, 28 (Walter B.
Raushenbush ed., 1986) ("Between 1972-73 and 1982-83, the number of women grew from 11.8
percent to 36.8 percent of all law students, an increase of more than 285 percent. Substantial growth
was also realized in the number of minorities enrolled in law school---an increase of some 73 percent
between 1972-73 and 1982-83."). By noting these demographic changes, I do not mean in any way
to suggest that the admission of women and minorities somehow led to a compromise of Catholic
identity of necessity. On the contrary, it is my contention that Catholic law schools may have
maintained a robust sense of their identity while at the same time welcoming students from
traditionally under-represented groups.
28.
The fact that Catholic law schools traditionally provided a means of entry into the legal
profession for the children of recent immigrants, many of whom were Catholic, has been observed
by both supporters and opponents of Catholic legal education. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, The
Catholic Tradition,22 VAL. U. L. REv. 669, 670 (1988); Mark Tushnet, CatholicLegal Education at
a National Law School: Reflections on the Georgetown Experience, in GEORGETOwN AT TwoHUNDRED: FACULTY REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIvERsITY's FUTURE 321, 323 (William C. McFadden

ed., 1990).
29.
A striking example of this enormous change can be found in the contrast between the
self-description offered by St. Louis University School of Law in 1957 and that offered by the school
today. See supra note 24.
30.

See, e.g., JAMES CARROLL, CONSTANTINE'S SwORD: THE CHURCH AND THE JEws-A

HISTORY 12, 577-87 (2001) (asserting that "Christian faith can seem to triumph over every evil
except Christian triumphalism" and that the Church can only overcome its triumphalism and
exclusivism by abandoning its belief in the Incarnation and the salvific work of Christ's passion,
death and resurrection); DANIEL C. MAGUIRE, THE MORAL CODE OF JUDAISM AND CHIusTIANITY:

RECL.AIMING THE REVOLUTION 38 (1993) (declaring that "[t]here can no more be 'one true religion'
than there could be one exhaustively 'true' poetry that supersedes all others. The mystery does not
allow for such reductionist imperialism."); Arthur Jones, Theologians See, Experience Downside to
John Paul I1 Papacy, NAT'L CATH. REP., Apr. 2, 2005, available at http://www.nationalcatholic
reporter.org/update/conclave/arthujones.htm (quoting Rev. Charles Curran as saying what
"bothered" him about John Paul U's papacy was that the Pope taught that "[t]he church has the truth"
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31
must be admitted that there is something altogether correct in this perspective.
Thus, while I am not nostalgic for the inflated pride that may have typified a certain
segment of the Church prior to the Council, I do hope that Catholic universities can
recover a proper understanding of Christian triumph: the triumph of the Cross. This
is not triumphalism in the sense of self-righteousness or vanity but joy-the joy of the
Christian heart and mind that, with genuine humility, feels compelled to share what it
knows. 32 It is the humble triumphalism of the early Church that, as Saint Paul said,
dared to speak and "liv[e] the truth in love. ' 33 It is this strange, paradoxical Christian

with "never any mention that the church has to learn the truth" such that "there was this horrendous
triumphalism").
31.
Pride in the splendor of Christ's gift of redemption was often expressed in the past as a
personal pride, as pride in oneself as a member of the redeemed. This kind of pride often took the
form of a belief in the superiority of persons and nations rather than a pride in the triumph of Christ
over sin and death, a pride in Christ as the ultimate revelation of God in history. As the fathers of the
Second Vatican Council stated, Jesus Christ is "the Lord in whom the full revelation of the supreme
God is brought to completion." SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL CoUNCtL, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION
ON DIVINE REVELATION DE!VERBUM 7 (1965), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_
Moreover,
councils/ii vatican council/documents/vat-ii const 19651118 dei-verbum en.html.
because the Incarnate Savior established "the new and definitive covenant [that] will never pass away
... we now await no further new public revelation before the glorious manifestation of our Lord

Jesus Christ." Id.4 (citation omitted). See generally CONGREGATION

FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE

FAITH, DECLARATION ON THE UNICITY AND SALVIFIC UNIVERSALITY OF JESUS CHRIST AND THE

CHURCH DOMINusIEsus 4 (2000), availableat http://www.vatican.va/romancuria/congregations/
cfaith/documents/rc con cfaith doc 20000806_dominus-iesus en.html (criticizing relativistic
theories that seek to justify religious pluralism while rejecting the claim that the revelation of Jesus
Christ is somehow incomplete such that it may be supplemented by other religions). It is surely
laudable to show respect for the sincere religious beliefs of non-Christians and to encourage interreligious dialogue especially in the present context of globalization and wide-ranging religious
pluralism. See, e.g., SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP
2 (1965), available at
OF THE CHURCH TO NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS NOSTRA AETATE

http://www.vatican.va/archive/histcouncils/ii-vatican-council/documents/vat-ii-decl19651028_
nostra-aetate en.html ("The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these [other]
religions. She regards with sincere reverence those ways of conduct and of life, those precepts and
teachings which, though differing in many aspects from the ones she holds and sets forth, nonetheless
often reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men."). Unfortunately, the desire on the part of
some theologians to promote this kind of dialogue has led to an abdication of the Christian message
inits integrity. See generally ROGER HAIGHT, JESUS: SYMBOL OF GOD (1999). For the Church's
magisterial response to this error, see CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAIT, NOTIFICATION
ON THE BOOK "JESUS SYMBOL OF GOD" BY FATHER ROGER HAIGHT, S.J. (2004), available at

http://www.vatican.va/roman curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc con cfaith doc 20041213_
notification-fr-haight en .html.
32.
1 Corinthians 9:16 ("If I preach the gospel, this is no reason for me to boast, for an
obligation has been imposed on me, and woe to me ifI do not preach it!").
33.
Ephesians 4:15. See JoHN PAUL H,APOSTOLIC CONSTrrlmoN ExCORDEECCLESiAE 32
(1990) [hereinafter Ex CORDEECCLESL4E], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_ father/john_paul_

ii/apost-constitutions/documents/hfjp-ii apc_15081990_ex-corde-ecclesiae en.htln ("[A] Catholic
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triumph that gives hope, not for a return to the past, but for a future in which Jesuit
and other Catholic law schools have confidence in the power of the tradition to
address the issues of the day in a way that people will find compelling.
In. THE ARGUMENT NOT HEARD

Although I have received a number of comments and criticisms in response to
34
the piece, I have yet to hear an argument that directly challenges the central thesis.
No one has been brave enough to argue that the promotion of justice can be attained
simply through the affective experience of sympathy for a disadvantaged client in a
clinical setting, while ignoring the study of justice as an academic subject in the
classroom. Simply put, to promote a desire for justice on the part of students at Jesuit
law schools, these students must be given the opportunity to carefully consider what
justice is, and what it is not. Similarly, no one has argued that if a Jesuit law school
university must have the courage to speak uncomfortable truths which do not please public opinion,
but which are necessary to safeguard the authentic good of society.").
34. The absence of any argument challenging my central thesis, it should be noted, is true
even of the most forceful and thoughtful responses I have received in response to the original article.
See Moore, supra note 16; Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., "The Just Man Justices": Justice and the
Curriculum in the Jesuit Law School (unpublished paper delivered at the RALS conference at
Baylor, on file with the author). For example, although Andrew Moore has misgivings about my
proposal that Jesuit law schools require a first-year course in jurisprudence, he does not dispute the
failure of such law schools to live up to their avowed commitment to the promotion of justice.
Although Moore stresses the special capacity clinical education has for making a lasting impression
on students (a quality I happily acknowledge and support), he admits that clinical education as it is
currently practiced at Jesuit law schools is "insufficient," that what is lacking is an intellectual
engagement to match the personal experience, "an integration of contact with concepts." Moore,
supranote 16, at 470. Although Father Kalscheur says that my proposal suffers from a "fundamental
flaw" in that I purportedly '"educe" education conceming justice to a required course in
jurisprudence, Kalscheur, supra,at 1-3, he refrains from engaging in the conceit that the law schools
sponsored by the Society of Jesus today have succeeded in fulfilling the ambitions of General
Congregations 32 and 34, and with good reason. To do so would call into question the otherwise
reasonable points that he raises. Indeed, to celebrate the current state of Jesuit legal education as the
realization of Jesuit mission would be to forsake an honest assessment of the state of these law
schools for a kind of wish-fifillment.
The source of the distinction between "contact" and "concepts" to which Professor Moore
refers is an address by Father Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, S.J., the Father-General of the Society of
Jesus. See Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, S.J., The Service of Faith and the Promotion of Justice in
American Jesuit Higher Education, Address at Santa Clara University § 111.A (Oct. 6, 2000),
availableat http://www.creighton.edu/CollaborativeMinistiy/kolvenbach_speech.html. Perhaps the
most succinct and thoughtful rebuke to this contemporary Jesuit emphasis on "contact" over
"concepts," on direct service over rigorous thought, on the affective over the intellectual, comes from
the late Pope John Paul HIwho observed "there is no renewal, even social, that does not begin with
contemplation." John Paul H, Address to the Third Ecclesial Convention of the Church in Italy,
Palermo (November 23, 1995), in THE PRIVATE PRAYERS OF POPE JoHN PAUL II: AN INVITATION TO
PRAYER 26 (2002).
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were to introduce students to different theories of justice, such a school would not
have the further obligation to introduce the contributions to this discourse found in the
Catholic intellectual tradition. Likewise, no one has argued that the Catholic identity
of a Catholic law school need not be concerned with the intellectual work of the
school reflected in its curriculum and classroom teaching, as well as in the
scholarship that it encourages and promotes.
I do not believe that any argument has been offered against the thesis advanced
in the earlier article because none can be offered. It would indeed be laughable to
suggest that a Jesuit law school had adequately equipped its graduates with the
intellectual tools they will need to address the many difficult questions of justice in
practice simply by giving them the option to work for a semester in a law clinic. It
would be even more ludicrous to suggest that a Catholic university could fulfill its
identity by ignoring the Catholic tradition in the intellectual work that it performs.
Instead of an argument based on reason, the only objection that can sensibly be made
is an assertion of will-a claim made on the part of some faculty to the effect that "I
don't want my law school to look like that, to engage in that sort of academic
enterprise." Surely such a claim could be dressed-up to look like a legitimate
argument when accompanied by reasons of a practical nature concerning the school's
limited resources, its likely appeal to a diverse applicant pool, as well as its ability to
attract talented faculty, and the like. These practical arguments may reflect a genuine
concern on the part of faculty or they may be a useful subterfuge for avoiding a
candid discussion about Jesuit identity. What they are not are conceptual arguments
that a law school can be authentically Catholic and Jesuit and still ignore the Catholic
intellectual tradition. An argument to this effect simply cannot be credibly
maintained.
IV. CONCEIVING OF CATHOLIC IDENTITY:
THE ICING ON THE CAKE VS. THE AIR IN THE BALLOON

How is it that the presence of clinics became the conventional answer given in
response to questions concerning a law school's fulfillment of its Jesuit and Catholic
mission? Several reasons immediately come to mind that explain the prevalence of
this response. First, clinical programs are conspicuous. They are by their very nature
highly visible to the public in that they serve clients from outside the law school and
university communities. Moreover, unlike classroom instruction which directly
benefits only the students enrolled, the work of clinics is not simply a matter for
internal consumption. Second, and relatedly, the services performed by clinical
instructors and law students have the practical effect of helping those in need.
Although a thoughtful seminar on immigration law or the morality of capital
punishment may help to advance a school's Catholic mission, representing an illegal
immigrant facing deportation or a convicted felon on death row has the visceral feel
of a concrete response to injustice. Regardless of the merits of one's case, justice
demands that an individual receive competent legal representation, and clinics are a
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way of meeting this need. Third, and perhaps most importantly, law school clinics
serve a useful purpose within the scheme of faculty politics by keeping the potentially
divisive matter of religious affiliation off the table. As such, law school clinics
became the predictable response to questions concerning mission because they
provided a convenient diversionary tactic. By pointing to clinics as a clear sign of
meaningful Jesuit and Catholic identity, law school deans and faculty avoided
answering far more difficult questions concerning the place of this identity in the
intellectual work of the institution. With the willing acquiescence of university
officials, law school faculty avoided asking what "the promotion of justice" meant in
the context of a Jesuit and Catholic law school and how their teaching and
scholarship helped to advance this project. Having never asked the question, Jesuit
law school faculties thus avoided any uncomfortable conclusions that may have
followed.
Although each of these reasons may, in part, explain why Jesuit and other
Catholic law schools turned to their legal clinics as proof of their commitment to
justice and the fulfillment of their mission, there is another, deeper reason which
accounts for this common strategy. This reason can be found in the very notion of
Catholic identity in the context of a university that has been conceived and is still
conceived in the minds of many Catholic educators. Specifically, it is the notion that
Catholic identity is "something more" in an arithmetic sense. It is an additive, a
bonus feature, an extra ingredient that is placed along side that which is already
present, namely, the university itself. It may change the flavor of the institution to a
greater or lesser degree, but it does not change the essential quality of the institution
as a university. As such, Catholic identity is a component that can be removed from
the whole without any substantial change in the function of the university or its way
of being. It is a quality that remains on the surface. It does not penetrate the whole
and alter its internal constitution. In an ultimate sense, the quality of being "Catholic"
is an additive that remains external to the quality of being a "university" as such. At
most, the relationship is one of complementary juxtaposition, the effect of which is
largely aesthetic.
Perhaps more than any other document, the famous Land O'Lakes Statement,
issued by the presidents of several prominent Catholic universities in 1967, led to the
popular acceptance of this view among Catholic colleges and universities.35 Indeed,
LAND 0' LAKEs STATEMENT: THE NATURE OF THE CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC
35.
UNivERsrrY (1967), reprintedin AMERICAN CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION: ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS

1967-1990, at 7 (Alice Gallin ed., 1992) [hereinafter LAND O'LAKEs STATEMENT]. The departure by
many Catholic and other Christian sponsored colleges and universities away from a definite sense of
mission and toward a more secular character has been the subject of several recent historical studies.
See, e.g., JAMES TUNSTEAD BURTCHAELL, THE DYING OF THE LIGHT. THE DISENGAGEMENT OF
COLLEGES AND UNrVERSrrEs FROM THEIR CHRISTIAN CHURCHES (1998) (describing the process of
secularization at institutions sponsored by seven different Christian denominations); GEORGE M.
MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIvERSrY: FROM PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO

ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF (1994) (setting forth the Protestant foundations of American higher
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the Land 0 'Lakes Statement clearly embodies the notion that Catholic identity is an
additive, an extra ingredient not found in the recipes of other universities. In its
opening lines the Statement provides: "The Catholic University today must be a
university in the full modem sense of the word, with a strong commitment to and
concern for academic excellence" but that "[t]he Catholic university adds to the basic
idea of a modem university distinctive characteristics which round out and fulfill that
idea." 36 The Statement goes on to say that although "[e]very university, Catholic or
not, serves as the critical reflective intelligence of its society[;] .. . the Catholic
university has the added obligation of performing this same service for the
Church. ' 37 Clearly, this presupposes that a "Catholic university" is a "university"

education and the subsequent marginalization of Christian identity).
36.
LAND O'LAKES STATEMENT, supranote 35, § 1 (emphasis added).
37. Id § 5 (emphasis added). The same paragraph continues to say that "the [Catholic]
university should carry on a continual examination of all aspects and all activities of the Church and
should objectively evaluate them. The Church would thus have the benefit of continual counsel from
Catholic universities." ld Although the authors of this passage may have intended it as a generous
offer to place the talents of Catholic university professors at the service of the Church, the hubris
reflected in these few words is nothing short of staggering. Indeed, the remarkable role envisioned
for Catholic universities in this passage is that they should function essentially as outside auditors
overseeing "all aspects and all activities of the Church" rather than as communities of the faithful
within the Church who share the same heart and mind. Id
It has often been said that to appreciate the beauty of a cathedral's stained glass windows one
must view them from inside the church. The same could be said of the Church's doctrines and
practices. Thus, to offer the Church the gift of one's "critical reflective intelligence" is one thing, but
to "objectively evaluate" the Church from an external perspective is problematic at best. What would
it mean, for example, to examine and "objectively evaluate" the Eucharist? What would an objective
evaluation of the Church's teaching on homosexuality, or abortion, or the possibility of women's
ordination entail? Indeed, if, as David Schindler contends, "there are no instances of purely formal,
hence neutral, methodological procedures... that, on the contrary, all methodological procedures,
insofar as they claim to mean anything at all... imply and thus are shaped internally (ifoften tacitly)
by metaphysical and theological presuppositions," DAvID L. SCHINDLER, HEART OF THE WORLD,
CENTER OF THE CHURCH: COMMUNIO ECCLEsIOLOGY, LIBERALISM, AND LBERATtON 154 (1996), then

the objective evaluation promised in the Land O'Lakes Statement is simply not possible. Indeed,
such an examination and evaluation of the Church's teachings and practices might incorporate
metaphysical and theological presuppositions inimical to the faith of the Church.
In its exuberance, the Land O'Lakes Statement glosses over the apparent tension that exists
between commitment to the truth as already known and proposed by the Church and commitment to
the truth as suggested by one's academic discipline. The tension is no longer felt when the former
commitment is no longer present, or when Catholic identity is abandoned, when it is thought of as
something "other," as something distinct and separate from the intellectual work of the university in
general and the discipline in particular.
In his apostolic constitution on Catholic universities, Ex CORDE ECCLESIAE, John Paul II was
clearly aware of the purported tension between "the search for truth and the certainty of already
knowing the fount of truth." See EX CORDE ECCLES4E, supra note 33, 1 (footnote omitted). He
contends, however, that precisely because it is committed to the truth of the faith, the Catholic
university is actually "more capable of conducting an impartial search for truth, a search that is
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with something more added to it, an appealing bonus feature, but one that does not
alter the central activity of the university as such, namely, the intellectual work that it
performs in research and classroom instruction.
So conceived, Catholic identity is like the icing on the cake, or the cherry on top
of a sundae. Icing may add flavor to a cake, but one could still have and enjoy a cake
even if icing were never added. Catholic identity is thought of in the same manner
with respect to a Catholic university or law school, as a non-essential and unintegrated component. 38 The claim that clinics function as the repository of Jesuit
and Catholic identity reflects precisely this view-the view that such identity is a
distinct item that can be added to the make-up of an institution without changing it in
a substantial fashion. Thus, a strong desire to promote justice, as evidenced by the
mere presence of a law school's legal clinics, is the something more-the cherry on
top of the sundae of Jesuit legal education.
Let me propose an alternate conception of Catholic identity. Instead of thinking
of Catholic identity as the icing on the cake, it should be thought of as the air in the
balloon-as that which literally inspires the university filling every part of it with
meaning and direction. It is not a component that is something in addition to that
which is already there. Rather, it is integral to the thing itself. Without the air inside,
the balloon would surely lose its integrity and purpose.
In the Christian and Hebrew scriptures, the image of breath or spirit3 9 has
enormous significance: It is the spirit-the breath-of God that moves over the
waters of the abyss at the beginning of creation.4 ° At the pinnacle of this creation is

neither subordinated to nor conditioned by particular interests of any kind." Id 7. Because "truth
and one's
cannot contradict truth" the seeming need to choose between one's commitment to the faith
commitment to an academic discipline is a false choice. The tension is only apparent, not real.
Similarly, John Henry Newman resolved this apparent tension with an audaciously bold claim, a
claim that is in fact the underlying premise of every genuinely (as distinguished from the merely
nominally) Catholic university: "Right Reason, that is, Reason rightly exercised, leads the mind to
the Catholic Faith, and it plants there, and teaches it in all its religious speculations to act under its
guidance." JOHN HENRYNEWMAN, THE IDEA OFA UNIVERSrIY 137 (Martin J.Svaglic ed., 1982).

38.
Moreover, because it is not constitutive of the university itself, the extra ingredient is
interchangeable with a variety of different components. Ham is essential to a ham sandwich, but
whether it is made with Swiss cheese on rye or Monterey Jack on wheat is entirely a matter of taste.
It is something separable (if not something entirely separated) from that which is already present.
Likewise, under the conception of Catholic identity reflected in the Land O'Lakes Statement,
Catholic identity is thought of as something that is a separable if not entirely separated from the
university per se. It is a component or quality that can be segregated from the whole, set apart from
the institution which remains intact and complete in itself.
39.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 691 (1997) ("The term 'Spirit' translates the
Hebrew word ruah, which, in its primary sense, means breath, air, wind. Jesus indeed uses the
sensory image of the wind to suggest to Nicodemus the transcendent newness of him who is
personally God's breath, the divine Spirit.") (referring to the discourse between Jesus and the
Pharisee Nicodemus in John 3:1-2 1).
Genesis 1:2.
40.
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the human person. God forms man "out of the clay of the ground" breathing "into his
nostrils the breath of life" so that man becomes "a living being. '41 After His
resurrection, Christ visits his disciples in the upper room, even though the door was
locked. He breathes on them and they receive the Holy Spirit which is the life of the
Church.42 In the same manner, the Catholic identity of a Catholic university-and by
extension a Catholic law school-should literally be its life's breath!
In the law school setting, this alternate way of thinking about Catholic identity
forbids relegating it to the mere existence of legal clinics. Likewise, the tradition of
celebrating a Red Mass, the presence of a law school chaplain on campus, or the
placement of crucifixes on the classroom walls will not suffice. Although each of
these features is significant in its own way, each is an un-integrated bonus feature.
Each is a component part that rests on the surface of the law school without altering
its internal constitution. If Catholic identity is as vital to a Catholic law school as air
is to a balloon, then it must be present in an essential way throughout the school's
operations, including the intellectual work performed by its faculty in teaching and
scholarship. Simply put, the faculty of a Catholic law school must be engaged with
the Catholic intellectual tradition.
Accordingly, to borrow from John Courtney Murray, one might describe a
Catholic university as a "conspiracy" for truth.43 Murray reminds us that the original
Latin meaning of the term is not invidious. A "conspiracy" literally means a "unison,
concord, unanimity in opinion and feeling, a 'breathing together."' 44 Those who
breathe together unite in action "for a common end about which there is
agreement."'45 The common end of a university is the education of its students and
the search for truth. The "conspiracy" of an authentic Catholic university can be
found in that its faculty and students all breathe the air of the Catholic intellectual
tradition. It is not essential that faculty share a unanimity of opinion with respect to
the truth of what that tradition proposes on every conceivable subject. Indeed, some
diversity of opinion is unavoidable given the competing voices within the tradition
itself, in addition to those outside it. Moreover, as a practical matter, the diverse
makeup of faculties and the exercise of academic freedom guarantee a wide range of
opinion. What is essential is that faculty members acknowledge the centrality of the
tradition in the life of the university. At the very least, the "conspiracy" of Catholic
higher education demands that teachers make the substance of the Catholic
intellectual tradition available to students as a perspective in their classes, and that the

41.
42.
43.

Genesis2:7.
John 20:19-23.
See JOHN CouRTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECnIONS
ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSmON 22 (1960). 1 am indebted to my colleague Michael J. Schuck for
suggesting Murray's wonderful phrase to me.
44.
45.

Id.
Id
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institution generously support those scholarly efforts that seek to advance the tradition
in the contemporary academy.
V

THE TRADITION IN A SOUND-BITE: "MAN IS NOT THE MEASURE OF ALL THINGS"

In my original article, I attempted to summarize some of the defining features of
the Catholic intellectual tradition, notwithstanding its long history and enormous
scope. 46 1 also described in rather broad terms the essential content of what I take to
be the Catholic perspective on the nature of justice and its relation to law.47
Obviously, a great deal more could be said about each of these subjects.
Nevertheless, perhaps a better way to describe the significance of the tradition in the
context of legal education is to say what it is not.
What distinguishes, or what should distinguish, a Catholic law school is that it
offers an alternative to the secular perspective on reality, including the nature of law.
By "secular" I do not refer to the basic premise that underlies our political order,
namely, the claim that individuals must be free to believe in whatever religion they
choose or none at all, without interference from the state,48 and that the institutions of
government may not promote the religious beliefs of any particular faith.49 I do not
use the term "secular" in the sense of being "non-religious" or the opposite of
"theocratic." Instead, I use the term to refer to something more basic.
The word "secular" comes from the Latin "saeculum" which means "the current
age" or, as we might say, "the times." On a certain level we are all "secularists" in
that we are all concerned with the practical demands and requirements of the work-aday-world. Whether those demands involve the price of gasoline, the latest weather
forecast, or the hour of one's next appointment, our field of vision and concern is

46.

See Breen, supranote 1,at 405-09 (especially n.96).

47.

Id. at 406-10.

48.
See, e.g., Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,492-93, 495-96 (1961) (quoting Everson v.
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)) (striking down Maryland's requirement that any person
assuming public office must declare a belief in God since "neither a State nor the Federal
Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion' nor
can it "pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers" or "aid
those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on
different beliefs"). This freedom also means that the government must abstain from resolving
religious controversies among religious adherents. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (stating that courts
should refrain from attempting to resolve such disputes because "the hazards are ever present of
inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of

purely ecclesiastical concern").
49. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992) (prohibiting a public high school
from including a prayer as part of its commencement ceremony because "[t]he Constitution forbids
the State to exact religious conformity from a student as the price of attending her own high school
graduation").
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focused on the present times. To be "secular," in this older and deeper sense, is to
limit one's self to what is immediately at hand.
Because the conventional genealogy of secularism conflates the concept of
secularism with liberal democracy's strict separation of state power and ecclesial
authority, the origins of secularism are often traced back to the Enlightenment. 50 In
fact, the philosophic origins of secularism, properly understood, predate the
Enlightenment by nearly two millennia. This world-view is perhaps best summarized
in the teachings of one of the pre-Socratic philosophers, Protagoras of Thrace.
According to Protagoras "[o]f all things the measure is' 5Man,
of the things that are,
1
that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not.
This expression may be interpreted in a variety of ways ranging from the
commonsensical to the genuinely radical. It is, for example, indisputable that
individuals and groups of people must, as a practical matter, decide what is true and
what is false. Each of us must make these sorts ofjudgments in order to manage our
own affairs. In this way, the claim that "Man is the measure of all things" is true, but
uncontroversial.
However, the expression can also be construed as a radical claim about the
nature of human knowledge in general, and of moral knowledge in particular. First,
to say that "Man is the measure of all things" can be interpreted to mean that reality is
circumscribed by that which man can see and grasp. Indeed, as the former Joseph
Ratzinger noted in an important book written shortly after the Second Vatican
Council, "[m]an is a seeing creature, whose living area seems to be marked off by the
range of what he can see and grasp." 52 Because man is a sensual being, some regard
knowledge gained through the senses as normative for all forms of knowledge.
Indeed, the defining characteristic of the scientific attitude that so deeply influences
our culture is that knowledge is limited "to 'phenomena', to what is evident. ' 53 As
Ratzinger notes, the methodology of the natural sciences is restricted to that which
"can be seized in our [own] measuring grasp ' 54 either through the senses or by

50.

See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxii-xxvii (1996 paperback ed.).

51.

KATHLEEN FREEMAN, ANCILLATO THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS 125 (1996).

52.
JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY 50 (J.R. Foster trans.,
2004) (1968).

53.
54.

Id. at 58.
Id. Ratzinger's critique of this severely constricted view of human reason has been a

recurrent theme throughout his life. See, e.g., JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, SALT OF THE EARTH:
CHRISTIANITY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM-An Interview with

Peter Seewald 163-64 (Adrian Walker trans., 1997) [hereinafter SALT OF THE EARTH] (criticizing the
dominant world-view from the Enlightenment that "takes a very dogmatic posture and excludes
interventions of God in history" and reduces religion "to the purely subjective" and observing that
this "naked rationality reduced to the natural sciences" is unable to "answer the real questionsquestions like where do we come fiom, what am I, what must I do to live properly, what am I here
for at all"); JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 66 (Brian McNeil trans.,
2006) [hereinafter VALUES INA TIME OF UPHEAVAL] ("The real problem that confronts us today is
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devices that function as extensions of the senses. Ratzinger traces this perspective
back to the thought of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant and especially Giambattista
Vico who replaced "the old equation of truth and being" with the new equation of
"truth and factuality." 55 According to this new equation "all that we can truly know
is what we have made ourselves. ' 56 The task of the human mind is no longer "to
think about being; rather, it is to think about thefactum, what has been made, man's
own particular world, for this is all we can truly understand." 57 Although Ratzinger
attributes this point of view to three major figures of the Enlightenment, across the
centuries the voice of Protagoras can be heard: "Man is the measure of all things."
This voice can also be heard in the realm of normative discourse. It is the voice
of subjectivity and relativism. Because "Man is the measure of all things" no
conduct. 58
objective standards exist by which to judge the morality of human
Instead, the individual has "the prerogative of independently determining the criteria
of good and evil and then acting accordingly. ' 59 Moreover, from this perspective,
law, like morality itself, is a mere human construct, a pure invention. Although law
reason's blindness to the entire nonmaterial dimension to reality.").
During his recent address to the faculty at the University of Regensburg, Joseph Ratzinger, now
Pope Benedict XVI, offered "a critique of modem reason from within" arguing for a "broadening
[of] our concept of reason and its application" and rejecting "the self-imposed limitation of reason to
the empirically falsifiable" as the sole criterion for genuine knowledge. Benedict XVI, Faith, Reason
Memories and Reflections (Sept. 12, 2006), available at
and the University:
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict-xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hfbenxvi spe 20060912_university-regensburg_en.html. "Modem scientific reason," he argued, "bears
within itself a question which points beyond itself and beyond the possibilities of its methodology"
precisely because it "quite simply has to accept the rational structure of matter and the
correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing rational structures of nature as a given." Id.
As Benedict argued in a subsequent address, the scientific world-view according to which "only
what is experiential and calculable would be rationally valid," creates a culture that "represents a
radical and profound break not only with Christianity but more in general with the religious and
moral traditions of humanity." Benedict XVI, Address to the Fourth National Ecclesial Convention
in Italy (Oct. 19, 2006), availableat http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/benedict xvi/speeches/2006/
october/documents/hf ben-xvi_spe_20061019_convegno-veronaen.html. As such, it is "not able to
establish a true dialogue with other cultures." Id By reducing ethical claims to merely subjective
matters of opinion, this narrow rationality wrongfully suggests that "we live in a world that almost
always appears to be of our making, in which, so to speak, God no longer appears directly but seems
to have become superfluous, even out of place." Id.
55.
RATZINGER, supranote 52, at 61.
56. Id at 59.
Id. at 61.
57.
58.

See ALASDAIR MACINrYRE, AFER VIRTUE: A STUDY INMORAL THEORY 19 (2d ed.

1984) (describing the central claim of emotivism as being "that there are and can be no valid rational
justification for any claims that objective and impersonal moral standards exist and hence that there
are no such standards").
59.
JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER VERITATIS SPLENDOR 32 (1993), available at
http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0222/_P4.HTM.
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may provide a means for the resolution of disputes and the legitimate exercise of state
power, law can only function as a matter of convention. It cannot be a matter of truth
since there is no objective truth that reality presents to the human mind for its
reception. There is only that which man, the measure60of all things, makes for himself.
He is the creator of his own moral and legal universe.
The Catholic intellectual tradition may be taken as an extended refutation of this
radical claim--a claim that is the premise upon which much of modernity is based.
Granted, man must discern the truth, and he influences that which he comes to
believe is true through this process of discernment. 61 Nevertheless, the truth is still
principally something outside of man himself, and the process of discernment aspires
to be a movement beyond the immediate confines of his being, beyond that which he
has made. In his search for truth, man does not want merely to find himself Indeed,
he wants to know the other, in itself, and not as a construct of the one who searches.
60.
Some might object that this is a false dilemma, that some defensible middle ground
exists between a wholesale form of relativism and some version of natural law or moral realism. For
example, it might be suggested that some version of Kantian constructivism provides an
intellectually respectable via media for those who fear the abyss of relativism yet can't quite bring
themselves to embrace a kind of natural law.
To set forth a thorough-going response to this objection would far exceed the scope of this
essay. Briefly put, I would argue-together with Alasdair Maclntyre-that Kant failed in the great
project of demonstrating the authority and objectivity of moral rules apart from a teleological
understanding of the human person. Indeed, Maclntyre argues that Kant recognized this failure in
the Critique of PracticalReason and concluded that "without a teleological framework the whole
project of morality becomes unintelligible." MACINTYRE, supra note 58, at 56. Once detached from
"any view of man as having an essence which defines his true end," id at 54, the content of morality
that Kant inherited and advocated could only be sustained as a matter of convention. If MacIntyre is
correct in this critique, then Kant and his successors-including those successors most popular
among American legal academics such as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Bruce Ackerman- set
forth more or less sophisticated versions of moral conventionalism. See Michael S. Moore,
Metaphysics, Epistemologyand Legal Theory, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 453,457-59 (1987) (describing the
work of Dworkin and Rawls as examples of contemporary conventionalism in moral and legal
theory). Conventions are, by definition, man-made practices or constructs that serve a practical end,
often simply as a matter of convenience. See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern
Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 871, 878-81 (1989) (describing the difference
between philosophical realism and conventionalism); John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and
the Lessons of Llewellyn, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 263, 430-42 (2000) (discussing the idea of a
convention and its relationship to truth, and the notion of legislative intent as a matter ofconvention).
While I do not believe that either Kant or the contemporary conventionalists noted above
succeed in avoiding the pitfalls that are at the heart of Maclntyre's powerful diagnosis of normative
discourse, I do not mean to suggest that the contributions of these thinkers should not be part of the
examination of justice in a Jesuit law school curriculum. On the contrary, because the work of
Rawls, Dworkin and others is of importance in the present legal culture, their ideas should receive
thoughtful consideration in the Jesuit classroom.
61.
The observer always enters into the process of observation and influences the data that
results. See DAvtD BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER 69 (1983) (discussing the
Heisenberg indeterminacy principle).
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Thus, according to the Catholic perspective on law and justice, man is not the
measure of all things. Indeed, it is precisely this erroneous perspective which has led
and continues to lead to the most pernicious forms of injustice. 62 Accordingly, from
the Catholic point of view "[i]f there is no transcendent truth, in obedience to which
man achieves his full identity, then there is no sure principle for guaranteeing just
relations between people. ' 63 When the truth regarding the morality of human
conduct is not recognized "then the force of power takes over, and each person tends
to make full use of the means at his disposal in order to impose his own interests or
his own opinion, with no regard for the rights of others." 64 Once "[s]undered from
that truth, individuals are at the mercy of caprice, and their state as person ends up
being judged by pragmatic criteria based essentially upon experimental data, in the
mistaken belief that technology must dominate all.,,65 When man regards himself as
"the measure of all things," then he judges himself firee to determine, in whatever way
he pleases, that most basic of all legal and moral questions, namely, who qualifies
as a
66
"person," as a stakeholder in and beneficiary of the legal and political order.
From an institutional perspective, the claim that "Man is the measure of all
things" is anathema to a Catholic university. Indeed, to embrace such a perspective
would constitute an abdication of right reason, properly understood. At the same
time, sheltering students from this point of view is neither possible nor desirable.
Students cannot help but be exposed to the sort of relativism contained in this
expression since it is in the very cultural air that we breathe. However, being exposed
to something, like a contagion in the atmosphere, is quite different from being made
aware of it, having the opportunity to study it critically, and respond to it in an
appropriate fashion. Because of their overt commitment to the "promotion of
justice, ''67 any law school that claims a Jesuit identity must guarantee that its students
have the opportunity to critically examine the various strains of thought that make
human beings "the measure of all things," that place the human will at the center of
existence by treating it as the original source of meaning. Moreover, such a law
62.
See, e.g., VALUES INATIME OF UPHEAVAL, supra note 54, at 51 (noting that "neither the
Nazi nor the Communist dictatorship considered any specific action in itself as evil and invariably
immoral" and indeed, these regimes held that "[w]hatever served the goals of the Movement or the
Party was good, irrespective of how inhuman it might appear").
63.
JOHN PAUL I1, ENCYCLICAL LETrER CENTESIMUS ANNuS
http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0214/_P7.HTM.

64.

Id.

65.

JoHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETrER FDES ET RA77o

44 (1991), available at

5 (1998), available at

http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0216/_P2.HTM.
66.
For a powerful example of how this perspective has played a pivotal role in
contcmporary American jurisprudence, see John T. Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v.
Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV. 668, 673 (1984) (arguing that the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade "felt free to
impose its own notions of reality" such that "the biological reality" of the developing child in the
womb "could be subordinated or ignored by the sovereign speaking through the Court").
67.
See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
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school must ensure that its students are given the chance to consider possible
alternatives, including the various alternatives afforded by the Catholic intellectual
tradition.
VI. THE EDUCATED LAITY AND HIRING FOR MISSION

It is, of course, the faculty of any school that is primarily responsible for the kind
of intellectual engagement that defines the educational experience of its students.
Thus, a Jesuit law school that takes seriously its responsibility to promote justice
through a rigorous examination of the topic needs to adopt policies for identifying,
hiring, and retaining faculty suited to the task. This necessarily includes attracting
68
faculty who are willing to engage the Catholic intellectual tradition in some fashion.
There are undoubtedly a number of ways in which a Jesuit law school could go
about constituting such a faculty. However, in all likelihood, a Jesuit law school will
not ensure that its students enjoy a meaningful examination of justice and
engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition simply by "counting heads." That
is, a Jesuit law school will almost certainly not provide its students with the kind of
intellectual engagement required by its identity merely by hiring faculty who are
ostensibly or even professedly Catholic and then assuming that the mission will take
care of itself
Two reasons explain why such an approach is likely to fail. First, and most
importantly, "hiring for mission," as I understand it, is not about hiring persons of a
particular religious affiliation. 69 Instead, it is about identifying faculty candidates

68.
Engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition can take a number of different forms.
These different modes of engagement can vary widely, from a whole-hearted embrace of the tradition
and constructive participation within it, to a thorough critique of the tradition as a whole, or rejection
of some specific theme or claim expressed within it. Certainly a wide variety of perspectives on the
many intellectual traditions and schools of thought across the various disciplines are legitimate and
welcome parts of academic life in any university. However, in a Catholic university, it cannot be the
case that the exclusive or even the predominant mode of engagement with the Catholic intellectual
tradition is one of repudiation and critique. If that were the case, then the institution would
undermine its very reason for existence. Moreover, because rejection of the tradition in many ways
defines the contemporary academic milieu, a neutered Catholic university-a Catholic university that
abdicated its responsibility to engage the tradition constructively-would not offer its students an
education that would markedly differ from the kind of education available at avowedly secular and
non-Catholic universities. Indeed, the vibrant conversation that should define the academic
enterprise within and among institutions would be denied an important voice.
69. This is a point I was careful to emphasize in the original article. I specifically said that
faculty who can advance a law school's Jesuit mission "need not be Catholic" and that "Jesuit law
schools would be poorer institutions if people from other faith traditions were not welcomed and
included as colleagues in the project of Jesuit legal education." Breen, supra note 1,at 413-14.
Unfortunately, this emphasis did not prevent some critics from misconstruing the point. For

example, shortly after my original article on Jesuit legal education was cited in First Things, the
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin published a story about the piece. See Jerry Crimmins, Professoron
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who have the knowledge and inclination to "promote justice" through an examination
of the topic both in the classroom setting and in their scholarly work. Hiring faculty
who are Catholic may help to ensure the Catholic and Jesuit character of the
institution in other ways, but the specifically academic mission of the institution is
open to all. Indeed, faculty candidates of every religious persuasion or none at all
should find a Jesuit law school all the more appealing precisely because it takes the
promotion of justice seriously. Second, religious affiliation standing alone is a poor
indicator of the requisite knowledge and willingness to take up the educational
mission which Jesuit institutions profess. Plainly, the Catholic intellectual tradition
has made a vital contribution to the understanding of justice over the past two
millennia, and engaging this tradition must be an essential part of the classroom
experience at every Jesuit law school. Although it might seem reasonable to assume
that individuals who are Catholic in their upbringing or current religious affiliation
would be well-versed in this tradition and willing to embrace it in their role as

Quest to Put 'Catholic'OutFront,Cn. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 4, 2006. A few days later, another story
appeared in the paper in which Loyola's dean, David Yellen, and the former chair of the faculty
hiring committee, Anne-Marie Rhodes, defended Loyola's Jesuit identity and its hiring approach.
See Jerry Crimmins, Dean: Loyola 'Very Much a Jesuit'School,CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 11, 2006.
In the article, Professor Rhodes states that some faculty candidates were under the misimpression
"that only Catholics were hired" or that non-Catholics did not advance or fit in at the institution.
These views reflect a profound ignorance of the nature of Catholic higher education in general and of
Loyola in particular. Indeed, when viewed in a less charitable light, one might see these views as
reflecting a latent prejudice against Catholic institutions as closed-minded, insular and discriminatory.
As should be the case, Professor Rhodes says that candidates were informed that Loyola does "not
discriminate on the basis of religious background." She says that it was her goal "to hire good
colleagues. They may be Catholic and they may not be Catholic." Id
Unfortunately, one might incorrectly infer from these remarks that I am somehow opposed to
hiring non-Catholic faculty. I do not believe that a competent reading of what I stated in print--both
in the original law review article and in the subsequent newspaper story--support such a conclusion.
Indeed, my arguments and claims on the subject are entirely consistent with Professor Rhodes' stated
goal.
In the hiring process, Professor Rhodes insists that the subject of religious affiliation does not
come up. "It is not a question we ask.... We're always looking for the best qualified faculty, and
issues of religion just do not come out." Id Certainly, for a variety of reasons, it is improper to
bluntly ask a candidate about his or her religious affiliation. Indeed, any move that would make a
potential colleague feel unwelcome due to his or her religious belief, or none at all, should be
rejected. At the same time, Professor Rhodes' comments suggest that "looking for the best qualified
candidate" is a matter wholly unconnected to the question of religious identity. In fact, empirical
studies have shown, not surprisingly, that Catholic faculty are more likely to support a vibrant
Catholic identity at the institutions where they work. See D. Paul Sulins, The Difference Catholic
Makes: Catholic Faculty and Catholic Identity, 43 J.SCI. STUDY RELIGION 83, 83, 86 (2004).
Although Professor Rhodes says that questions of religious affiliation are not brought up, what I fear
was not brought up is any discussion of Loyola's Jesuit mission as a meaningful feature in the life of
the institution. What I fear is that no mention of the school's Jesuit identity was made beyond the
platitudes of "social justice" and "service for others."
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teachers, such an assumption would, in fact, be highly problematic. The reason why
this is so is deserving of some special attention.
There is a refrain that one hears repeated, over and over again, from certain
quarters in the Church, that we are fortunate in this country to have a highly educated
laity. Indeed, according to Richard McBrien, the United States has "the best educated
laity in the entire history of the church, ' 70 and we have the many colleges and
universities that operate under Catholic sponsorship to thank for this happy set of
institutions for
circumstances. According to McBrien, we should be grateful to these
7
'
helping to create "a more spiritually vibrant and faith-full church."
Although the point does not serve to advance the larger purpose that McBrien
intends, it must be admitted that there is some truth to this claim. While the American
laity still boasts a large number of people who recently arrived here from other
countries,72 the Church in the United States is no longer predominantly a church of
immigrants. 73 Catholics in America attend college and graduate school at rates
comparable to the rest of the population. 74 American Catholics today occupy

70.
Richard P. McBrien, Why I Shall Not Seek a Mandate, AMERICA, Feb. 12, 2000, at 14,
If Father
16, available at http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cftn?article-id=531.
McBrien recites his office as often as he appears to recite this mantra of liberal Catholic orthodoxy,
then he is to be complimented, at least for the former. For similar remarks about the American laity,
see Tom Roberts, From the Editors Desk, NAT'L CATH. REP., Nov. 14, 2003, at 2, 2, available at
1
http://natcath.org/NCROnline/archives2/2003d/ 11403/111403b.htm (quoting Rev. J. Bryan Hehir
speaking at Boston College as stating: "[T]he laity needs to say, at every level, 'We simply won't
accept anything less than adult conversation' - which is not rebellion or an attempt to defy the
church" and that "[Y]ou can't have a situation . . . where men and women in corporations,
universities, politics, in charge of their own lives.., are not treated as adults in the church. We have
in the U.S. today the most educated laity the Catholic church has confronted in 2,000 years."). A
slightly different version of what Father Hehir said can be found in From This Church ForwardBeyond the PresentState of Catholicism, B. G MAG, Fall 2003 (statement of Rev. J. Bryan Hehir),
available at http://bcm.bc.edu/issues/fall 2003/c2 1_nissert.html. ("[A]y view is, as a kind of simple
principle, that we've got to treat adults as adults in the Church. We now have in the United States the
most educated laity the Catholic Church has confronted in 2,000 years of history. You can't have a
situation where men and women are in charge of their lives, treated as adults in corporations,
universities, and politics, and are not treated as adults inside the Church.").
McBrien, supra note 70, at 16..
71.
For a vivid picture of how immigration continues to play an especially significant role in
72.
the development of the Church in one region of the United States, see CALIFORNIA CATHOLIC
CONFERENCE, PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE OF THE CALIFORNIA CATHOLIC CHURCH: A DEMOGRAPHIC

STuDY (2006) (concluding that by 2025 one-third of all Californians will be Catholic, a change that
will occur largely through immigration and the higher birthrate among Hispanic Catholics).
For a thoughtful overview of the Church's immigrant history in the United States and the
73.
ongoing process of Catholic assimilation into American society, see generally PHILIP GLEASON,
KEEPING THE FAITH: AMERICAN CATHOLICISM PASTAND PRESENT 35-81 (1987).
74.

See, e.g., MARK S. MASSA, CATHOLICS AND AMERICAN CULTURE:

FULTON SHEEN,

DOROTHY DAY, AND THE NOTRE DAME FOOTBALL TEAM 203 (1999) (stating that "Catholics were, by
1966, more likely to have more years of education and have a higher income than the national
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important positions in business, organized labor, the professions, and politics. The
recent appointment of John Roberts and Samuel Aiito to the Supreme Court (bringing
the number of "Catholics," if not "Catholic jurists," who sit on the high court to five)
demonstrates the relatively newfound prominence enjoyed
by what had been, little
75
more than a generation ago, an outlier's religious sect.
But this fact raises two significant points concerning the faculties at law schools
that operate under Catholic auspices. First, if this demographic transition of Catholics
from disadvantaged immigrants to highly educated citizens is true, then why aren't
these individuals being recruited to serve on the faculties of Catholic universities and
law schools? One study conducted on the religious make-up of law school faculties
found that, compared to their representation in the general population, Catholics are
grossly underrepresented in the legal academy. 76 Although this phenomenon may

average, despite the media propagation of stereotypes of hard-hat 'urban ethnics'). A recent survey
of 112,232 entering first year students attending 236 diverse colleges and universities across the
country indicated that Catholics accounted for 28% of entering freshman, the highest percentage of
any religious denomination, whereas the mainline Protestant faiths (Episcopalian, Presbyterian,
Methodist, and Lutheran) constituted 17% of entering freshmen combined. HIGHER EDUC.
RESEARCH INsT., UNWV.OF CAL., L.A., THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS: A NATIONAL
STUDY COLLEGE STUDENTS' SEARCH FOR MEANING AND PURPOSE 3, 17 (2005), available at

http://spirituality.ucla.edu/results/index.htn-;
see also Christian Smith & Robert Faris,
Socioeconomic Inequality in the American Religious System: An Update andAssessment, 44 J. ScI.
STUD. RELIGION 95, 97-98 (2005) (reporting data covering 1998-2000 showing that 21.7% of
Catholics held college degrees compared to 16.4% of Southern Baptists, 24% of Missouri and
Wisconsin Synod Lutherans, 27% of United Methodists, 39.7% of Presbyterians, 45.5% of
Episcopalians, 60.2% of Jews, and 61.1% of Unitarians).
75. See, e.g., Margaret Ramirez & Manaya A. Brachear, With Alito, Catholics Would Be
Court Majority, CHI. TRDB., Jan. 13, 2006, at C12 (noting the change in the national perception of
Catholics since the election of President John F. Kennedy and cautioning against attaching too much
significance to a Catholic majority on the Court because of a diversity of views on particular issues
by professing Catholics); The Papal Court, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 2006, at 34, 34 (placing the Alito
appointment in the context of electoral politics where Catholics function as swing voters, but likewise
concluding that "[t]he court's Catholic majority is unlikely to vote as a block, even though they were
all appointed by Republican presidents").
For an account of how virulent anti-Catholicism in the United States was regarded as
intellectually respectable as recently as the 1950s, see generally JOHN T. McGREEVY, CATHOLICISM
AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 166-88 (2003) (discussing the overt anti-Catholicism of author Paul

Blanshard, Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, Harvard president James Bryant Conant and others).
76.
Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Prmxy and Religion as Prvxy, 43 UCLA L. REV.
2059, 2073 n.23 (1996) (citing James Lindgren, Presentation to National Association of Scholars:
Measuring Diversity (Jan. 1996) (unpublished manuscript) (stating that although Catholics and
Orthodox Christians make up 26% of the full-time working population they account for only 13.7%
of law school faculty, whereas Jews account for only 2% of the population but make up 26.4% of law
faculty). To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that these numbers tell the story of Jews excluding
Catholics from legal academia based on their religious faith. Rather, at Catholic law schools, this
overall pattern suggests either a strong indifference or hostility to the school's stated mission. In turn,
this translates into a lack of interest in candidates who might wish to see the mission fulfilled in a
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come as no surprise given the latent but nevertheless real suspicion among academics
of religious persons in general and of Catholics in particular, 77 the relative dearth of
Catholic faculty at purportedly Catholic law schools should be surprising. It is
explicable only in terms of a definite loss of a sense of mission where "mission" is
understood in terms of the conviction that the Catholic intellectual tradition has
something valuable to contribute to academic discourse concerning questions of law
and justice, and the obvious need for faculty who are knowledgeable about this
tradition and so able to participate in this discourse.
In this regard, let me briefly share my own anecdotal experience of faculty hiring
at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, an institution that proudly identifies
itself as one that embodies the "Jesuit tradition." 78 I was hired as an assistant
professor in 1996. At that time the faculty was made up of twenty-eight tenured and
tenure-track faculty members. Today, in 2007, the Law School has thirty-three such
positions. During this eleven year period, Loyola hired thirteen new faculty members
on either a tenured or tenure-track basis. 79 Of these thirteen hires-approximately
forty-percent of the Law School's faculty-only two have been at least nominally
Catholic. It is significant to note that the numbers would be even more skewed in this
direction if tallies were made of all the candidates who were invited to interview at
the Law School, and of prospective candidates to whom offers were made but who,
for whatever reason, declined to accept.
What accounts for this seeming pattern in hiring decisions? Is it a matter of
deliberate exclusion or just the result of an unfortunate happenstance of events? One
way to answer this question is to look at what Loyola has and has not done. The Law
School recruitment committee has not actively sought out Catholic intellectuals as
possible faculty candidates by, for example, advertising faculty positions in
Commonweal, America, or First Things, as some other Catholic law schools have
done. Moreover, in the interviews with candidates and colleagues to which I have
been privy, candidates have been readily assured that Loyola's Catholic identity
should not be a source of concern, and that its Jesuit identity simply reflects a special
interest in "ethics" and "social justice." 80 While it may well be the case that a
robust manner. See also David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Proposalsto Counter Continuing
Resistance to the Implementation of Ex Corde Ecclesiae, 74 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 629, 638 (2000)

(asserting that "nominally Catholic law schools are, overtly or instinctively, doing their perverse best
to reduce their number of Catholic faculty").
See, e.g., PHILiP JENKINS, THE NEW ANTI-CATHOLICISM: THE LAST ACCEPTABLE
77.
PREJUDICE 34-36 (2003).
78.
See Loyola University Chicago School of Law Mission Statement,
http://www.luc.edu/law/about/mission.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
79.
The absence of a larger net gain in the number of faculty during this period is due to the
fact that many of these appointments were replacement hires for colleagues who retired, moved
laterally to other schools, or who passed away.
80.
See Breen, supra note 1, app. at 419-31 (appendix collecting self-descriptions of the
fourteen Jesuit sponsored law schools, including many references to the respective schools' interests
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conscious decision to avoid creating a law school that is "too Catholic" for their taste
may have informed the decision-making of some colleagues, I would be loathe to
think that these results derive from some sort of anti-Catholic animus. 81 At the same
time, it would be wrong to describe these colleagues' collective attitude toward Jesuit
and Catholic identity as "benign indifference" since indifference is never benign
where something truly important is at stake. Instead, I would suggest that the pattern
derives precisely from the decision to relegate concerns about "mission" to the
operation of clinical programs that serve the poor and disadvantaged. It may also
reflect a decision on the part of those who serve on the committee to favor the
candidate who has the slightly more prestigious clerkship, or the additional
publication or who represents a desired form of diversity over the well-qualified
candidate who lacks these characteristics but who might contribute to the mission of
the school beyond the boundaries of the clinic.
Second, even if it is admitted that American Catholics are now generally well
educated and enjoy some measure of success in the professions and other fields of
expertise, it must also be admitted that they do not enjoy the same level of
sophistication with respect to the faith they purport to profess. Although this
appalling lack of knowledge seems to have escaped the notice of Father McBrien, the
point has not been lost on John Cavadini, McBrien's colleague at the University of
Notre Dame and his successor as chairman of the theology department. Indeed, for
Cavadini, "the religious [ignorance] of so many otherwise well-educated . . .
Catholics is [almost] too familiar to bear mentioning again."82 According to
Cavadini, because "catechesis never developed much past the first post Vatican H
'touchy-feely' phase,"83 one has come to expect "that even at elite Catholic colleges
and universities, entering students will not know what is meant by the 'Immaculate
Conception,"' or the number of natures and persons in Christ and the Trinity, or what
is meant by the phrase "Real Presence." 84 Perhaps professional courtesy keeps
Cavadini from observing that this profound ignorance exists not only in entering
students, but in the graduates of elite Catholic colleges and universities, even the
bright lights who were once entertained by Father McBrien's classroom instruction.

in ethics and social justice as proof of their Jesuit identity).
81.
I say this not only because living with the consequences of making such an accusation
would be difficult, but because I do not believe it to be true. On the contrary, I consider myself
blessed to serve with my colleagues at Loyola and I count many of them as good friends.
82.

John C. Cavadini, Ignorant Catholics: The Alarming Void in Religious Education,

COMMONwEAL, Apr. 9,2004, at 12, 12.
83.
Id; see also, SALT OF THE EARTH, supra note 54, at 125 ("Our religion instructors rightly
repudiated the idea that religious instruction is only information, and they rightly said that it is
something else, that it is more, that the point is to learn life itself, that more has to be conveyed. But
that led to the attempt to make people like this style of life, while information and content were
neglected. Here, I think, we ought really to be ready for a change....').
84.
Cavadini, supra note 82, at 12.
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Again, anecdotally, I can attest to this fact from my own experience of teaching a
law school course in Catholic social thought over the past ten years. Although the
course typically attracts students from a number of religious backgrounds, the
majority of students who enroll tend to be Catholic. Invariably, I have found that
these students take the course as much out of a desire to learn more about the content
of the faith and the nature of the Church, as to study the Church's social doctrine and
its relationship to law. Thus, I find that for some students the class functions as a sort
of remedial course in basic catechesis. What makes this situation all the more
troubling is that these are students who often attended Catholic parochial or high
school, or who graduated from a Catholic college or university.
Thus, even as educated American Catholics are committed to some general
notion of the Christian faith and to the community of believers who gather in Christ's
name, they remain largely ignorant of both the content of that faith and the nature of
the Church founded by Christ, directed toward the Father and sustained by the Holy
Spirit. The Church is now, says Mary Ann Glendon, "paying the price for [a] threedimensional disaster: formation, formation, and formation," that is, "formation of our
theologians, of our religious educators, and thus of parents." 85 The absence of proper
formation is in fact a species of malformation. Nature abhors a vacuum and so young
Catholics tend to be formed by the culture that surrounds them. The results of this
wide-spread malformation, as Glendon bluntly states, are that Catholics
"no longer
86
know how to talk about what they believe or why they believe it."
This is especially significant in that it was the willingness and ability to say
why---to give an account of one's beliefs in a manner accessible to others-that made
the faith such a potent source of cultural development. It was a desire to explain why
the faith was true and how these truths connected to the wider world that gave rise to
the Church's intellectual tradition in the first instance, a tradition that has included not
only explicitly normative subjects such as ethics, politics,87and law, but the graphic
arts, music, architecture, literature and the natural sciences.

85.
Mary Ann Glendon, The Hour of the Laity, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1, 2002, at 23, 27.
86.
Id.at 25. The situation is actually even worse than the passage in Glendon's article
might suggest. That is, the person who no longer understands why the Church believes what she
professes to be true may, nevertheless, remain active in the Church. Although the extent of such a
person's commitment and participation may vary greatly (from nominal belief and infrequent
reception of the sacraments to active involvement in the devotional and charitable life of a parish) it is
discemable in some fashion. In fact, many young Catholics wrongly conclude that the Church's
doctrine cannot be defended or that it is explicable only in terms of power exercised within a political
institution. As a result, many abandon their practice ofthe faith altogether.
87.
For a spirited and wide-ranging account of the crucial role of Christian inspiration in the
development of these various arts and disciplines, see THOMAs E. WOODS, JR., How THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH BUILT WESTERN CrIvILIzArION 1 (2005).

See also WALTER KASPER, THE GOD OF JESUS
CHRIST 17 (Matthew J. O'Connell, trans., The Crossroad Publishing Company 1984) (1982) (arguing
that the biblical faith in creation as distinguished from the numinous conception of the world in
antiquity made science possible: "Only when the transcendence of God had been taken seriously did
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The consequences of this colossal failure in catechesis 88 for Catholic legal
education are enormous. Even assuming a desire on the part of Catholic law schools
to fulfill their special mission (a somewhat dubious assumption), this failure in
fonnation renders Catholic legal academics-who are otherwise well-educated and
well-intentioned-ill-equipped to participate in the kind of cultural and intellectual
engagement vitally needed in the academy today. Because they belong to the Saint
Thomas More Society and attend the annual Red Mass, they may present a Catholic
face, but they do not, as David Schindler has said, think with a Catholic mind.89 They
are ill-prepared to connect the content of the faith to the content of the law and legal
profession, let alone make this connection in a rigorous and intellectually attractive
way.
If, as Cavadini says, we believe "that Catholics should be effective agents of
moral change, bearing witness to gospel values in the triple vocation of Jesus as
'priest, prophet, king"' then "Catholics must have a vocabulary to articulate the
values to which they bear witness, the world view and system in which such
convictions make sense, [as well as] the reason [the Church] talk[s] about the dignity
of human persons." 90 As Glendon insists, "American Catholics need to rededicate
themselves to the intellectual apostolate, not only for the sake of the Church's
mission, but for the sake of a country that has become dangerously careless about the
moral foundations on which our freedoms depend." 9'
The task of a Catholic law school is,• of course, education-the• passing on92 of
.
knowledge from one generation of lawyers to the next. Nemo dat qui non habet is
a maxim of the law that applies with equal force to legal education as it does to the
law of property. Law professors who are unfamiliar with the Catholic intellectual
tradition cannot be expected to lead their students in an examination of the meaning
of that tradition as it relates to law. Thus, the long term solution to the problem of
identity in Catholic law schools lies in hiring for mission-a difficult task that now
requires an even more thoughtful and deliberate response precisely because of the

it become possible to experience the immanence of the world, and only after the world had been
acknowledged simply as world could it become the object of objectifying scientific study and
technical information.").
88. Notwithstanding Father McBrien's cheerful rhetoric concerning the laity's knowledge of
the faith, supra note 70, empirical studies have confirmed the less optimistic sorts of claims made by
Cavadini and Glendon concerning the relative ignorance of Catholics with respect to the faith and
their adherence to it. See generally DEAN R HOGE, Wi-LiAM D. DINGES,

MARY JOHNSON,

S.N.D. &
(2001)

JUAN L. GONZALES, JR., YOUNG ADULT CATHOLIcs: RELIGION IN THE CULTURE OF CHOICE

(analysis of phone interviews of 848 adult American Catholics ages 20-39, plus select intense
interviews and focus groups).
89. Cf SCHINDLER, .upra note 37, at 147 ("To have a Catholic university... it is necessary
(also) to develop a Catholic mind.").
90. Cavadini, supranote 82, at 12.
91.
Glendon, supranote 85, at 28.
92. "No one gives who has not." BALLENTNE'S LAw DICTIONARY 842 (3d ed. 1969).
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failures in catechesis described above. Indeed, without a faculty committed to the
project of93Catholic legal education as such, any talk of Catholic identity is utter
nonsense.

Obviously, the process of hiring for mission raises a whole host of issues that are
beyond the scope of this essay.94 As noted above, merely counting the heads of
nominally Catholic faculty members misconstrues the point of hiring for mission and
is discriminatory in a decidedly non-Catholic way. To exclude a person from
consideration for a faculty position merely because he or she is Lutheran, Jewish,
Muslim, or atheist would be contrary to Catholic principles concerning justice and the
common good. Moreover, given the failures in catechesis outlined above, an
approach which simply focused on a candidate's Catholic affiliation would in any
case fail to build a faculty equipped to advance the mission of the school, properly
understood. Suffice it to say that implementing a plan for hiring Catholics and nonCatholics
93.

95

who are genuinely interested in the law school's mission as such, requires

The old saying about rearranging the chairs on the deck of the Titanic comes to mind,

although the analogy fails in that the ship (i.e. the law school) will not necessarily sink-only its
Catholic identity will be lost. The vessel may stay afloat in that the law school will continue to
function, but with a crew that has no interest in the original destination. It will now sail in a very
different direction.
One simply cannot have a genuinely Catholic university without Catholics, or more correctly,
Catholic intellectuals. Without this intellectual presence-asking the questions prompted by the
tradition and testing the answers that it presents--one may have a very fine university but it will not
be a Catholic one. In the same way, one may have a very fine garden, full of many interesting fauna,
but if no animals are present, then one will not have a zoological garden. Catholic intellectuals are
the animals, as it were, that need to be present for a university to be genuinely Catholic.
Similarly, if one wants to assemble a successful baseball team one needs to recruit baseball
players-people who not only possess the necessary physical skills, but people who know and love
the game and are familiar with its traditions, in short, people who value baseball. If instead one
chooses to recruit cricket players because they seem to know something about throwing and fielding
a small, hard ball, and hitting that ball with a bat, and they appear to wear the uniform just as well,
then one shouldn't be surprised at the results. That is, if one assembles a team of players who know
very little about baseball and who do not see the value and enjoyment of baseball as a sport, then one
shouldn't be surprised to find the players ignoring that game and playing a very different one,
notwithstanding the fact that the club advertises itself as a baseball team.
94. See Amelia J.Uelmen, An Explicit Connection Between Faith and Justice in Catholic
Legal Education: Why Rock the Boat?, 81 U. DET. MERcy L. REv. 921, 936 (2004) ("Finding law

faculty who have the background, the interest, and the guts to draw out the intellectual connections'hiring for mission'-is perhaps the most daunting task for any school that might consider defining
their mission as described above.").
95.
Although I have focused on the hiring of specifically Catholic faculty in most of the text
above, as I stated in the original article, the goal of hiring for mission is not a mere assemblage of
people who happen to share a common religious affiliation. See Breen, supra note 1, at 413-14.
Instead, the goal is to gather a community of scholars-Catholic and non-Catholic alike-who
recognize the value of the mission and who wish to advance it through their teaching and writing. In
this regard, the formal characteristic of religious affiliation or church membership is insignificant
compared to the substantive commitment to engage the tradition.
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a willingness to candidly discuss that mission with those who seek to join the faculty.
Where those responsible for faculty hiring are unable to engage in such a
conversation and indeed to show genuine enthusiasm for the project of Catholic legal
education, 96 then the exercise of leadership--meaning specifically the university
president and provost or chief academic officer-will be crucial. Under the
circumstances in which many Catholic law schools find themselves today, the
exercise of such leadership is necessary to ensure that the mission of the school is not
discarded sub silentio.
VII. INVITING AND ENABLING CURRENT FACULTY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MISSION

Hiring is about the future. What about the present? What about the current
faculty at law schools operating under Catholic auspices? Many, if not most of these
colleagues are tenured and likely have been involved in some discussions concerning
Catholic identity at some point in their careers. The legal constraints posed by tenure
prevent even a newly converted, mission-driven school from simply dismissing these
individuals, and doing so would be unjust in any case. As a fundamental matter,
Catholic moral teaching prohibits treating persons as things, as objects that can be
discarded. Rather, as persons, faculty members of all persuasions must be respected
for who they are and the gifts they bring to the common enterprise of legal education.
Thus, a reinvigorated Catholic and Jesuit identity must not mean that non-Catholic
colleagues should be somehow less valued than their Catholic counterparts. Instead,
the Catholic law school truly committed to fulfilling its mission must find some way
of welcoming all faculty, regardless of religious background, to share in the
conversation and invite them to collaborate in the mission. Doubtless in some cases
this invitation will be met with rejection, but the effort must be made. Indeed, the risk
of rejection has always accompanied the Christian as he or she has approached the
world. 97 To fail to make the invitation would demonstrate a lack of fidelity to the
mission on the part of the institution and would ensure perpetuation of the status quo.
What I propose is that the law school host a faculty seminar or colloquium to
introduce faculty to the Catholic intellectual tradition and explore ways in which it
might be introduced into the curriculum. Such a gathering could be jointly hosted by
a group of Jesuit and Catholic law schools, across the country or within a given
region, that are now seriously interested in recovering the heart of their identity,
schools no longer swayed by the cheerful reply that Catholic identity is thriving on
campus: "Just look at our enrollment in service projects!" Such a seminar or
colloquium might be conducted in an intense fashion, during, for example, two or
three weeks over the summer, or it might take place on a weekly basis over the course
of one or two semesters. 98 Jesuit law schools state that their mission is the promotion
96.
97.
98.

See supranotes 68-70 and accompanying text.
Cf Matthew 10:11-14;Acts 13:48-52.
There is no established model for encouraging the kind of engagement suggested in this
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of "justice" yet there are many perspectives on justice that differ radically from one
another and from those found within the Catholic intellectual tradition. To fulfill their
stated mission, and to make the seminar a rich, textured intellectual experience, as
well as one more palatable to faculty hostile to Catholic identity, Jesuit law schools
may wish to introduce the Catholic intellectual tradition alongside competing theories
of justice. For example, selections from the work of Louis Kaplow, Steve Shavell,
and Richard Posner9 9 might be juxtaposed with Mark Sargent's stinging critique of
Law and Economics written from the perspective of Catholic social thought,' ° ° and a
piece by William Eskridge or Andrew Koppleman' 0 1 in favor of same-sex marriage
might be read along side an article by Gerry Bradley or Robert George. 10 2 In this
way, faculty may gain some exposure to contemporary Catholic legal thought and an

appreciation for the wide variety of perspectives on questions of law and justice vying
for attention within the academy.
essay. A program known as "Collegium," begun by faculty at Fairfield University and now based at
the College of the Holy Cross and affiliated with the Association of Catholic Colleges and
Universities, was developed in response to the problem of maintaining mission given the difficulties
many schools have encountered in attracting "new faculty who can both articulate and expand the
vision of the Catholic intellectual tradition." See Collegium: About the Program,
http://web.accunet.org/collegium/about.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007). The program is undoubtedly
well-meaning in that it genuinely welcomes faculty from all faith traditions, however, its presentation
of the Catholic intellectual tradition is plainly inadequate. At best, what Collegium provides is not an
introduction to the Catholic intellectual tradition, but only an introduction to an introduction. Indeed,
given the very limited reading that the program requires of its participants, something more
substantive, rigorous, and challenging is needed. Moreover, because it involves faculty from across
all disciplines, Collegium lacks the focus necessary for any one faculty member to see the deep
relevance of the tradition to his or her own work. Aside from Collegium, other efforts have tended to
focus on the issue of faith in public life or the particulars of Ignatian spirituality. See, e.g., Uelmen,
supra note 94, at 937 n.34 (describing Fordham Law School's ongoing faculty colloquia on religion
that began in 2001). Surely whatever new initiatives are begun that are designed to engage existing
faculty in a more robust understanding of Catholic and Jesuit identity should build on what has
already taken place without being restricted to past efforts. For a thoughtful collection of essays on
the distinctive approach that Jesuits have traditionally brought to education, an approach that is
distinct from but not exclusive of the contemporary emphasis on service, see MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY,
S.J., THE CATHOLIC UNIvERsrrYAS PROMISE AND PROJECT REFLECTIONS INAJESUIT IDIOM (1998).

99.
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the
Pareto Principle,Preferences and DistributiveJustice, 32 J.LEGAL STUD.331 (2003); Richard A.
Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law, in CHICAGO
LECrURES INLAWAND ECONOMICS 189 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).
100. Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic Critiqueof Law
and Economics, 44 J. CATH.LEGAL STUD. 35 (2005).
101. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the
Jurisprudenceof Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L. REv. 853 (2001); ANDREw KOPPLEMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS
QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2002).
102. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley,Same-Sex Marriage: Our FinalAnswer?,14 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHIcs & PuB. POL'Y 729 (2000); Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the
Liberal Imagination,84 GEO. L.J. 301 (1995).
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In conducting such a seminar or colloquium, the effort must be made to connect
these various perspectives on justice to the central doctrinal courses of the law school
in much the same way that Deborah Rhode has shown how discussions of legal
ethics can be introduced across the curriculum. 10 3
Indeed, the successful
implementation of a "pervasive method" in which discussions of justice are
integrated into substantive courses throughout the curriculum will be a necessary
component of any serious attempt to fulfill the Jesuit mandate of promoting justice
and forming "men and women for others."' 0 4 At the same time, the use of such a
"pervasive method" cannot serve as a substitute for a required course in
jurisprudence.10 5 Indeed, the background provided by such a course is needed in
order to make discussions of justice in substantive courses meaningful, thoughtprovoking and worthwhile-in order to elevate them above the casual, speculative
chatter of college sophomores in late night bull sessions.
Obviously, conducting such a faculty colloquium will require good faith on the
part of those colleagues who participate. Although a Catholic law school cannot
prevent its faculty members from responding in bad faith to this invitation, it can do
much to engender good will. Law professors know from experience and personal
reflection that legal academics are independent by nature. Thus, if participation in
such a seminar were required by the dean or university administration, faculty would
likely respond with the same enthusiasm that third-year law students demonstrate in
required third-year classes. People generally respond better to positive incentives
than to coercive measures. Thus, to encourage a positive sense of collaboration, the
school might consider linking participation in the seminar to course relief in the
following semester, or to the award of a larger summer research stipend. The school
might even consider hosting the summer seminar in a desirable location, away from
the university, in much the same way that bar-sponsored continuing legal education
programs are conducted. Although each of these approaches would come at some
price to the law school, the cost of maintaining the status quo-the price of doing
nothing while continuing to portray Jesuit legal education as distinctive in its
promotion of justice-is the price of mendacity.

103.

See, e.g.,

DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:

ETHICS BY THE

PERVASIVE METHOD (2d ed. 1998) (setting forth materials for discussing questions concerning
professional responsibility that can arise in civil procedure, contracts, property, tax, torts,
corporations, family law, and criminal law).
104. See supranotes 5-7 and accompanying text.
105. See Breen, supra note 1, at 400-03. In the field of legal ethics, it is common knowledge
that students at schools that claim to teach legal ethics by the "pervasive method," but do not require
a course devoted to professional responsibility, do not learn the subject.
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VIH. CONCLUSION

During the past thirty years, legal education has undergone enormous change.
Some of these changes have brought tremendous benefits to law students, to the

practicing bar, and to the society that lawyers serve. However, this period has not
been a time of unmitigated improvement. Chief among the negative changes that
have taken place is the loss of law schools that are unapologetic about their Catholic
identity. Although the work of the Society of Jesus was once known for its
boldness, 10 6 in the post-Conciliar period, Jesuit legal education has been
characterized by timidity, by an attempt to "fit in" with the academic mainstream, all
the while claiming to provide a "distinctive" educational experience.' °7 The new
project of Catholic identity in legal education is not simply an effort to recover the
past. Rather, it is an effort to make the future, to create a new kind of law schoolone that not only offers students the opportunity to become competent lawyers
through rigorous study, but one that challenges them to consider the nature of law and
the fundamental premises of our legal order. It also invites them to imagine a legal
order built on the premises of the dignity of the human person and the common good
that emerge from an engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition.
This project in particular and legal education in general would surely benefit
from the leadership of the Society of Jesus and the law schools that operate in its
name. Will the Society recover its roots? Will its members show the boldness that
once typified all of their apostolic work including their educational apostolate? The
call has been issued. What will be their answer?

106.

See, e.g., JOHN W. O'MALLEY, THE FIRST JESUITS (1993); WILLIAMV BANGERT, S.J.,A

(2d ed. 1986).
See Barkan, supra note 2.
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